

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MARCH, 1979

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# Current History

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# Current History

MARCH, 1979

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*How stable are the new nations of Africa? How are they affected by the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba? In this issue, seven articles analyze the situation in the African nations today. As our introductory article on United States policy points out, "The willingness of the administration [of President Jimmy Carter] to take well-intentioned initiatives has unquestionably improved the United States image in the continent, has encouraged Africans in southern Africa, and has helped confront the white regimes with the reality of their isolation."*

## United States Policy in Africa

BY RUSSELL WARREN HOWE  
*Author, Along the Afric Shore*

**A**FTER the administration of President Grover Cleveland and the Congress of 1885 refused to ratify United States participation in the Berlin Conference, the United States role in Africa during the colonial era was peripheral. Congressional revulsion to involvement in the "dark continent" deprived the United States of the trading privileges in Europe's new colonies that the Berlin document provided, although the United States became a major market for African commodities. The United States kept a more active consular corps in Africa than did the smaller colonial powers;<sup>1</sup> but until shortly after World War II, the African continent was usually regarded by State Department officials as a punishment zone for the unsuccessful or the unambitious. The cold war conferred on Africa a modestly strategic role, but the area remained in the United States view, the "responsibility" of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

As the wave of independence swept Africa in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Great Britain's African role declined; and French influence remained restricted to French-speaking Africa which, except on the coast, was a lunar landscape of underpopulated scrub and desert. After the United States took a role in restoring a measure of order to the chaos in the

Congo, President John Kennedy's Washington became the main Western influence on the continent and the principal source of aid to African nations without—or with few—strings. But, except in the Congo, the involvement remained precarious. The United States did not want to "get out in front" of the former colonial powers, including pre-revolutionary Portugal, although there were exceptions—notably United States moral support for the nationalists in Portuguese Africa, and the Kennedy administration's conflict with Brussels over Katanga.

From the late 1950's until 1977, the United States Africa policy varied little, except that its interest in Africa waned as the years passed. The controversial "Nissim 39"<sup>2</sup> did little more than affirm the previous United States position of rhetorical and moral support for southern African emancipation in a context of muted initiative and a general concern for African development. The administration of Richard Nixon was not noticeably less benign or less interested in Africa than the administration of Lyndon Johnson. Until President Jimmy Carter's election, the main single feature about United States policy in Africa was that it was invariably reactive to events, rather than initiating.

In most African areas, this attitude continues; but at least in southern Africa, President Carter has taken an innovative stance. The reasons are clear enough: the President's religiously motivated concern for Africans and for the southern African situation in particular;<sup>2</sup> his political symbiosis with Congressman (now Ambassador) Andrew Young; and his appointment of several pragmatic liberals with African or third-world backgrounds to key policymaking posi-

<sup>1</sup>National Security Memorandum 39, on which the broad guidelines of the Nixon administration's Africa policy were based.

<sup>2</sup>See Russell Warren Howe, *Along the Afric Shore: Two Centuries of U.S.-African Relations* (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1975).

<sup>2</sup>In a *Playboy* interview in 1976, Jimmy Carter said he had considered abandoning his political career to lead a crusade for reform in southern Africa.

tions, notably Anthony Lake as head of the State Department's policyplanning staff and Richard Moose as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. In addition, there was the fact that Jimmy Carter could not have been elected—and probably could not be reelected—without massive black American support (although it is questionable how much sustained interest more than a tiny minority of black Americans have in African events). In foreign affairs, only the National Security Council has remained, under Zbigniew Brzezinski as under Henry Kissinger, immune to the influence of Africanists.

Whereas Kissinger, despite his brief—and briefly successful—involvement with the southern African problem in 1976, viewed the continent as a sleeping giant best left undisturbed, President Carter, and Young, Lake and Moose have been prepared to take a more positive view; they have seen Africa, particularly southern Africa, as an area where only the United States can prevent chaos and secure justice.

Their activist, interventionist policies would have been easy to justify morally, even without the Cuban conquest of Angola (in the name of one of the contesting nationalist parties), and the Soviet, Cuban and Chinese roles in aiding resistance organizations in other parts of southern Africa; but the Communist involvement helped them to justify their program to a wider American audience, notably in Congress.

Of the four men, only Lake had any substantive knowledge of Africa. But if the others were no better versed in the region than their policymaking predecessors, they were more motivated. They were also more perceptive: they rejected Kissinger's belief that white southern Africa—except for Rhodesia—was impregnable, and they agreed with most Africanists that violent conflict in the area could only increase and that the white redoubt was ultimately vulnerable. They probably arrived at this correct conclusion with the same kind of wishful thinking their predecessors used to arrive at the incorrect conclusion: they are all deeply opposed to racism.

Thus, the United States has begun to take the lead in changing southern Africa, while carefully nurturing the support of Britain and the "front-line states" with regard to Rhodesia, and seeking the support of the leading Western members of the United Nations Security Council on Namibia.<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere in Africa, the Carter administration has tried to coordinate its broad policy with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or with groups of states in the various regions, with an emphasis on the support of Nigeria. The administration has respected the OAU principle that the old colonial frontiers are sacrosanct: in Zaire, where a corrupt, inefficient, unpopular, military-led government faced secession in Katanga in 1977 and 1978, the United States orchestrated intervention by

<sup>3</sup>France, Britain, West Germany and Canada.

France, Belgium and Morocco to prop up the Joseph Mobutu regime, and provided United States Air Force transportation—but only after a green light from the OAU.

United States policymakers support the OAU principle for the same reason OAU members do; they see Africa as an amalgam of colonially invented nations, blending thousands of kingdoms and chieftaincies, now subject to recurrent regional and national crises generated by tribal animosities, tribal irredentism, economic class divisions and poverty. Since independence, all these negative factors have increased. The dominance of one or more tribes over others is freed from colonial restraint; the desire to return to independent monatribal entities seems to many a natural corollary of independence itself; the difference in living standards between the poor and the rich is much greater than it was in colonial times; and the prices of African raw materials have for the most part failed to keep pace with global inflation. African sensitivities, however, usually require that these crises be solved by African nations individually, by regional African mediation or by the OAU; unsuccessful as African mediation has been, it seems unlikely that any outside white power, including the United States and the Soviet Union, could do better.

United States officials stress the fact that their working relations with African leaders are stronger than those of previous administrations, and the claim seems justified. Ambassador Young, in particular, because of his Cabinet rank and his closeness to President Carter, has overcome Africa's rule of thumb that the sending of an American black envoy implies that the African problem is on Washington's back burner. At the same time, more active United States participation in African affairs has inevitably led to clashes of opinion with African leaders, since it is difficult to be all things to all people. Where American initiatives are challenged and stymied—as in Rhodesia—American good faith has been questioned.

The Carter administration recognizes that Moscow, Peking and, more recently, Havana hold the advantage of having always been on the "right side" in southern Africa and on the side of the eventual winners. (This does not imply that the nationalists are "Communists," since Communist arms supplies were the only ones available.) The American policymakers believe that (as in the Middle East) the United States has the advantage of a certain acceptability to both sides in the conflict. Whereas the Soviet Union, China and Cuba can guarantee African victory by force, the United States holds out the possibility of a more peaceful and therefore perhaps swifter transition to representative government. But to make this work, the United States has had to try to convince the white regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria that their defeat is inevitable.

Unfortunately, the specifications for a defeat have proved no substitute for a defeat itself. Not surprisingly, both Pretoria and Salisbury have refused to resign themselves to defeat without a physical showdown. While Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and what the Rhodesian press calls the "three black-smiths"<sup>4</sup> in his Executive Council were on a controversial visit to the United States in 1978, Smith's security forces struck out on their own initiative at guerrilla base camps in Zambia. The United States believed that this action was intended to scuttle the projected all-factions conference Smith and his collaborators had just agreed to attend, since it would be politically impossible for the nationalist leaders to come to such a meeting under the duress of violence. Washington officials compared the Salisbury ploy to Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin's announcement of new settlements in West Jordan, which they saw as an attempt to deter Jordan from participating in talks with Israel to implement the main Camp David framework agreement.

As 1978 ended, the United States faced many setbacks to its southern Africa policy. Short of military defeat, Ian Smith seemed determined to impose a puppet African government on "Zimbabwe," with a large measure of power remaining in white hands through white Cabinet participation and with constitutional blocking devices in the legislature; South Africa was set on establishing a similar regime in Windhoek, Namibia. Both these gambits are indebted to the bantustan policy of limited independence for tribal reservations in South Africa and to the policy followed by France in most of her colonies as they became independent in 1960. In 1979, the United States intends to push for the eventual acceptance of the so-called Anglo-American plan for coalitional black government in Rhodesia, after a one-man-one-vote election without distinction as to race, and for implementation of the United States-sponsored U.N. plan for a similar transfer of power in Namibia.

Both President Carter and Ambassador Young believe that a multiracial solution is possible in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, although all senior American policymakers stress the fact that they do not believe that puppet regimes in Salisbury or Windhoek can last. They anticipate that similarly flawed regimes in the South African bantustans, now being pushed toward conditional independence, will also eventually change because of the pressure of internal discontent. The commitment to multiracialism is stressed by the frequent reference, in United States government statements, to "rights for all," implying continued white rights to citizenship and residence; this helps make policy more palatable to white Americans who are more concerned about the fate of white settlers

<sup>4</sup>Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaninghi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau.

than the fate of black guerrillas; it is also consonant with the ideals of Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young, who tend to see Johannesburg and Salisbury as potential Atlantas.

Another reason for the American commitment to multiracialism in Rhodesia, in particular, has been the American fear of a revanchist nationalist policy and of a post-victory civil war between the two main nationalist guerrilla factions. Either or both these developments would tend to discredit the administration's support for the nationalists in American eyes —perhaps in an election year. As one senior United States official put it to this writer, "Left to their own devices, each side in the Rhodesian conflict [Smith and his three collaborators on the one side, and the loose "Patriotic Front" guerrilla alliance on the other] would wish to control the election process and deform it." So the United States, while empathizing more with the Patriotic Front than with the "internal solution" leaders, has tended to pressure both sides evenhandedly. The existence of an armed, white-led resistance to the nationalists and the divisions in the nationalist ranks may make it less difficult for the United States to pressure the nationalists toward compromise.

If the Front eventually unified, it would almost certainly be under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and under Soviet and Cuban influence, to the detriment of China, which arms and trains the forces of Nkomo's rival, Robert Mugabe. Although the United States, like Britain, also leans toward Nkomo, this would be seen as a negative development. So far, however, the conflict between Nkomo and Mugabe seems durable: neither leader has shown any willingness to concede points to his adversary by bending toward compromise, although Nkomo is clearly trying to jockey the situation covertly to head Mugabe off at the rails.

#### THE AFRICAN HORN

Elsewhere in the continent, United States policy is committed to increased economic development, encouraging the entry of United States capital and technology and seeking new American markets for African goods, and to the containment of the cold war conflict in the Horn.

After the Soviet Union dropped its support for Somalia and gave full backing to the Ethiopian junta, Somalia—on the advice of Saudi Arabia and Sudan—turned to the United States. Ambassador John Loughran was authorized to offer Somalia United States military assistance to replace that of Moscow. Then the administration reversed itself and said that arms would be provided only if President Mohammed Siad Barre renounced Somalia's claims to the areas of his country lost to Ethiopia, to France (in Djibouti) and to Britain (in Kenya) at the turn of the century—

a pledge no Somali leader could make and still survive politically, and one that probably no Somali leader would wish to make. Moscow presumably hopes that the Ethiopian-Somali conflict will simmer down, and that Somalia, having learned that the United States is capricious and unreliable, will reforge her links with the Soviet Union. Somalia is, after all, a "socialist" state. United States policymakers, however, are anxious not to foreclose all options in Ethiopia, a more important country than Somalia and, for the two decades preceding the Ethiopian revolution, the principal friend of the United States in black Africa.

The expectation in Foggy Bottom is that the usual frictions will develop between Moscow and its protégé. Meanwhile, Somalia is probably getting all the arms she can absorb from West Europe, including supplies from private dealers paid for by Saudi Arabia, and the United States is offering Mogadishu a substantially increased economic aid package. Moscow has sought to solve the impasse between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa by suggesting federal autonomy for the Somali-speaking Ogaden and Haud districts of Ethiopia—while offering a similar solution for Eritrea, Ethiopia's dissident northern province. United States policymakers, in turn, while saying that a federal solution has merit, doubt if any country in Africa feels stable and secure enough to give regional autonomy to areas whose basic desire is secession.

The Carter administration appears to be as concerned in private as it is in public rhetoric about the role that Cuban forces have played in Angola and Ethiopia and may be expected to play in helping decide the outcome of the conflicts in southern Africa. The Cuban crusaders are seen as Moscow's Trojan horse, however sincere Premier Fidel Castro's commitment to the revolution in Africa may be, and despite his broad refusal of Soviet directives. United States officials insist that there is a qualitative difference between Cuban intervention in Ethiopia to support a friendly Marxist regime and French intervention in Zaire to support a friendly anti-Marxist one. They note that Cuban operations in Ethiopia (and in Angola, where the Soviet- and Cuban-imposed regime still faces widespread armed opposition) are of longer duration. Whether the French and the Belgians—dubbed "NATO's Cubans" by *The New York Times*—would have stayed longer in Zaire, had it been necessary, is a question that President Carter's men have not yet had to answer, although Moroccan forces have remained in Zaire as a praetorian guard for the Mobutu regime.

The term that is repeated again and again in the conversation of policymakers like Young, Lake and Moose is "instability." Like their predecessors, they regard unstable situations as more favorable to Moscow than to Washington, which remains committed to any status quo that is not hostile to the United States,

but with the exceptions imposed by President Carter's dedication to human rights and his opposition to racist rule.

Most United States policymakers, however, are pragmatic on the question of instability; they do not appear to share Riyadh's concern that a pro-Soviet Ethiopia could be a threat to Middle East oil fields, nor Britain's conservative belief that South Africa is the guardian of the "Cape oil route." No Defense Department contingency plans for World War III appear to envisage open-ocean conflict of any duration, and the so-called Cape sea lane, 1,700 miles wide, is not seen as blockadable, even if there were time to deploy the enormous Soviet fleet that would be required.

South Africa's role as a major source of minerals is considered, but American officials say that experience suggests that countries do not change their trading patterns when they change regimes; and the administration appears to believe that United States investment in South Africa will be safer if the United States is associated with the African revolution there. Senior policymakers regard South Africa as a festering sore, a "human rights" disgrace that should be resolved for moral reasons, and a cause of anti-white hostility—"instability"—in a continent which, though united on few issues, is as concerned with the fate of black southern Africans as the Arab world is with the fate of the Palestinians.

American policymakers recognize the fact that American leverage in Africa is limited by congressional restraints on overactive interventionism, the exclusion of any military initiative, the relative self-sufficiency of South Africa and Rhodesia, the impossibility of competing with Moscow and Havana in total support of the Ethiopian junta, and other factors. Further weaknesses in the administration's policy in Africa seem to observers with African experience to be the fruits of well-intentioned but misguided idealism. The administration, for instance, probably underestimates the likelihood that white military governments will take power in Salisbury and Pretoria and will pursue a last-ditch, scorched-earth policy of irredentism instead of accepting "integration"; and Jimmy Carter's Washington grossly overestimates the feasibility of multiracial government and

(Continued on page 130)

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**Russell Warren Howe**, the former dean of the U.S. press corps in Africa, spent 18 years in the continent and was, at various times, bureau chief of *The Washington Post*, the *Baltimore Sun*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*. His six books on Africa include a two-volume history of the sub-Saharan, *Black Africa* (Walker, 1967), a short historical study of U.S.-African relations, *Along the Afric Shore* (Barnes & Noble, 1975), and *The African Revolution* (Barnes & Noble, 1968).

“...changes in the guard in Pretoria may signal changes in South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy, but if such a démarche does occur, it will be slow and cautious.”

# South Africa and Namibia: Changing the Guard and Guarded Change

BY RICHARD DALE

Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

THE Republic of South Africa is a nation whose white rulers are subjected to unremitting stress; more often than not, South Africa is regarded as a pariah, in some ways reminiscent of Franco’s Spain after the end of World War II. As long as white minority rule survives, African states and their diplomats will make every attempt to have the regime in Pretoria scorned across the world, a task in which they have so far succeeded.<sup>1</sup>

The South African government was fully aware of attempts to initiate diplomatic, if not economic and military, closure and quarantine, and its foreign office began to develop its own expertise, particularly after South Africa was forced out (or decided to withdraw from) the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961. Only in the final years of South Africa’s membership in the Commonwealth did the office of her foreign minister take on a standing and luster all its own, particularly

under the late Eric H. Louw and his successor, Hilgard Muller.

As the Pretoria regime tried to outflank its adversaries on the continent and in the Sino-Soviet world, it modernized and enlarged its armed forces (with some unobtrusive assistance first from the United Kingdom and then from France), and it began to expand the scope of its diplomatic activity to keep its enemies at bay and to reassure its supporters of its value to the Western powers. In time, the Information Service of South Africa grew into a formidable first line of defense. Indeed, given the structure of the South African fourth estate, some of which was downright hostile to the Afrikaner nationalist regime,<sup>2</sup> and the quiet but powerful work of the South Africa Foundation in the private sector of those Western states that were not overtly antipathetic to South Africa,<sup>3</sup> the Information Service seemed to resemble a growth industry.<sup>4</sup>

Close observers of South African foreign policy drew attention to the increased tempo and scope of South Africa’s activities in areas beyond her writ of sovereignty. Concern and delight were expressed by Pretoria’s detractors and apologists, respectively, with regard to the détente exercise staged by the South African government, an attempt to charm those African-led states whose governments were not committed to an extremely hawkish position on apartheid in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> Trade, aid and visits to Pretoria were the visible symbols of this activist foreign policy, aimed at breaking the cordon sanitaire that the more militant states north of the Limpopo River had thrown around South Africa.

South African success rested, on the one hand, on the willingness of its African guests to respect its internal sovereignty\* and, on the other hand, on the vagaries of the mineral and agricultural commodity market and Western aid packages. South Africa could not be a foreign aid donor of the first magnitude nor could she offer a huge market for foreign African agricultural products, given the political skill of her white farmers,<sup>6</sup> who have had a long tradition of

\*Read: willingness to tolerate, if not condone, apartheid and willingness to abstain from destabilizing the Pretoria regime by endorsing or aiding African nationalist guerrilla units.

<sup>1</sup>This phenomenon is skillfully analyzed in Richard E. Bissell, *Apartheid and International Organizations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), especially chapters 3-6.

<sup>2</sup>Details may be found in Elaine Potter, *The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1975), particularly chapters 5-7.

<sup>3</sup>The history of the foundation is chronicled in Louis Gerber, *Friends and Influence: The Diplomacy of Private Enterprise* (Cape Town: Purnell & Sons [S.A.] [Pty.] Ltd., 1973).

<sup>4</sup>For a scathing account of this department, see Julian Burgess et al., *The Great White Hoax: South Africa’s Propaganda Machine* (London: The Africa Bureau, 1977).

<sup>5</sup>For an account favorable to South Africa, see Patrick Wall, *Prelude to Détente: An In-Depth Report on South Africa* (London: Stacey International, 1975). A critical account is contained in Sam C. Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: A Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975); chapters 8-11.

<sup>6</sup>The political power of the white agricultural community in South Africa is depicted in Stanley Trapido, “Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa,” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 57, no. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 75-87.

access to and success with the members of Parliament.

Recent revelations in the South African press, suggestive of investigative journalism and discreet leaks, along with findings by judicial figures, indicated that the responsible Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, and his top-ranking civil servant, Eschel Rhoodie, were involved in a series of activities that did little to enhance the quality of political morality and judgment in the administration. Mulder resigned his Cabinet position as a result of disclosures about secret slush funds in the Department of Information, and Eschel Rhoodie and his brother, Dennis Rhoodie, resigned their civil service positions in the Department of Information.

The so-called "Muldergate" episode<sup>7</sup> not only jeopardized Mulder's chances of inheriting the prime ministership from John Vorster but hinted at the extent of the power developed by the Department of Information, which was later renamed the Bureau of National and International Communication. The department had developed links with the Bureau of State Security (usually called BOSS, after its acronym)—now renamed the Department of National Security—and with figures in the defense establishment, and it had underwritten a research institute for foreign affairs and bankrolled a daily English-language newspaper in Johannesburg, presumably to portray the government in a more favorable light. It has even been suggested that John Vorster, who has since resigned as Prime Minister and has been elevated to the largely ceremonial office of President, was not totally ignorant of the activities of Mulder and Eschel Rhoodie.<sup>8</sup>

Just how far the South African judiciary will go into these charges and whether any of the principals will be brought to public trial to contemplate the prospect of imprisonment is not clear. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether the professionals of the Foreign Office in the historic Union Buildings in Pretoria will look with much favor on those engaged in what may be termed bureaucratic poaching.

The dismantling of Mulder's bureaucratic empire

<sup>7</sup>The phrase was used by Eric Madsen in his article, "The Lasting Effect of Muldergate," in *The Sunday Times* (London), November 12, 1978, as reprinted in U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs (USDS) *Press Clips*, vol. 13, no. 47 (November 22, 1978), p. 13.

<sup>8</sup>As suggested in an editorial, "The Horrifying Facts," *The Cape Times* (Cape Town), undated but *circa* December 6, 1978, as reprinted in *South African Digest* (Pretoria), December 8, 1978, pp. 25-26.

<sup>9</sup>Mr. Pik Botha's support is noted in " 'We Want Pik' Call," *The Star* (Johannesburg), September 30, 1978, p. 1. On the first ballot of the National party caucus, he received 22 votes, while P.W. Botha received 78 and Mulder garnered 72 votes. He was dropped in the run-off ballot of the caucus, which showed 98 votes for P.W. Botha and 74 for Mulder, according to "How the Caucus Voted," *The Star*, September 30, 1978, p. 1.

and shadow foreign office, traumatic as it might be to Afrikaner nationalist loyalists, does not mean that there will be a sudden rearrangement of foreign policy priorities. The crucial question is not what English-speaking white South Africans think about "Muldergate" but rather what the mythical, "average" Afrikaner elector will tolerate. Whether there will be a replication of the American experience of post-Watergate morality in the public realm is a crucial question. The new Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, is an experienced Cape Province leader who is steeped in the lore and craft of the full-time National party bureaucracy and also in the equally demanding area of defense management. Like his predecessor, P.W. Botha entered the premiership with an image of a hard-liner, a trait associated with Transvaal and Orange Free State Afrikaners rather than with Cape Afrikaners. P.W. Botha retained Pik Botha (a left-of-center candidate for the prime ministership) as Foreign Minister, thus providing a continuity in the foreign affairs field that is especially important in terms of the future of Namibia.<sup>9</sup> In addition, Prime Minister Botha added P.G. Koornhof, who holds an earned doctorate from Oxford, to his team, to handle what is now called "plural relations," a neologism replacing Bantu affairs, which in turn were once designated as native affairs. Political semantics aside, the entrusting of African affairs to this Oxonian has been interpreted by some observers as beneficial to the Africans of South Africa.

Traditionally, in the hurly-burly of Afrikaner politics, the ruling National party (which has been in power for three successive decades) tends to be sensitive to its right flank and thus to overreact to challenges from that quarter. Although P.W. Botha may have a slightly more liberal Cabinet than Vorster's, he nevertheless must contend with the *verkramptes* (the ultra-rightists), whose political and spiritual home has usually been the Transvaal or the Orange Free State, provinces that were once independent Afrikaner republics, which unsuccessfully engaged in coalition warfare against the British in 1899-1902.

One such *verkrampte* is Andries Treurnicht, who is currently a deputy minister in Botha's Cabinet and who is the leader of the Transvaal National party, a position once held by Mulder. How, or even whether, this conflict between the *verkramptes* and the *verligtes* (moderate conservatives) will be resolved is a crucial question, especially since there has been a modest changing of the guard in Pretoria, with the recent death of President of the Republic Nicolaas Diedrichs, Vorster's resignation and his installation as Diedrichs' successor, and the elevation of Vorster's Defense Minister, P.W. Botha, to the office of Prime Minister.

These changes in the guard in Pretoria may signal changes in South Africa's domestic and foreign policy,

but if such a démarche does occur, it will be slow and cautious. The quintessence of South African politics is, after all, who rules whom and what, and the scope and speed with which the polity (the white minority) decides to grant the non-polity (the Africans, Coloreds and Asians) those benefits that usually accompany citizenship. Decision-making, in brief, is command decision-making and is not the result of prolonged bargaining between equals. Apartheid is after all an asymmetrical power relationship. The Afrikaans-speaking whites control most of the state machinery and political power; their English-speaking white compatriots control the economic power.<sup>10</sup> Together, they can mobilize enough votes and economic resources to effect change.

Although they outnumber the whites, the Africans still lack domestic resources, including high income and skill levels, and they must rely on their own sense of identity and their friends beyond the borders of South Africa to redress their grievances and to claim their patrimony. Consequently, their struggle for power involves a ceaseless quest for foreign audiences. The politically alert stratum of Africans must decide whether to use the machinery of apartheid and thus realize their aspirations inside the white citadel or to attack the citadel from without with the assistance of friendly African states and major world powers. The continuing dominance of white power in South Africa has given rise to a new faith and a new faithful, namely, black power and consciousness.<sup>11</sup> Such an outlook, if it can transcend the very real barriers of ethnicity that are at work in black-ruled states, has far more potential appeal than the secular religion of

<sup>10</sup>For further details, consult Herbert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's Political Dynamics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) and Hendrik W. van der Merwe et al., *White South African Elites: A Study of Incumbents of Top Positions in the Republic of South Africa* (Cape Town: Juta & Company Ltd., 1974).

<sup>11</sup>A more extensive analysis of this may be found in Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

<sup>12</sup>See T. Dunbar Moodie, *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

<sup>13</sup>The divergent views of these two camps, which might very tentatively be termed liberals and radicals, are set forth in George W. Shepherd, Jr., *Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa* (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1977).

<sup>14</sup>For some of the more recent works on the question of investment and disinvestment, see *A Case against Disinvolvement in the South African Economy*, 3rd ed. (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Graduate School of Business Administration Centre for Business Studies, 1978); Ann and Neva Seidman, *South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1978).

<sup>15</sup>See Alexander Hepple, *Verwoerd* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 190-191, and Leo Kuper, *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), chapters 17-18.

Afrikanerdom, which rests on a basis of exclusivity.<sup>12</sup> The potential spread of black consciousness is far greater than that of Afrikanerdom.

In the United States, as in most other Western nations, two constituencies are concerned with South Africa, each with its heroes and its demons.<sup>13</sup> Very few espouse the politics of white paramountcy and embrace time-worn colonial doctrines of paternalism. Thus the argument does not turn on whether change is necessary in South Africa but on who will oversee that change. In brief, should the rulers of South Africa be defeated or should they be allowed to retreat with some of their possessions and with their dignity intact?

Because the United States has paid the human, social, economic and political costs of waging war in Southeast Asia and is chary of utilizing its armed forces overseas, Africans in South Africa who wanted to wrest power from their white rulers by force of arms must look for aid to the more radical African states. For them, deliverance has been synonymous with "armed struggle," which, in their idiom, means protracted guerrilla warfare.

For some time, the United States and other NATO powers have discussed the possibility of applying economic sanctions against South Africa (including disinvestment in the private sector) to initiate changes<sup>14</sup> in South Africa's government. Those who advocate such a course of action acknowledge that it will adversely affect the African breadwinner in South Africa but believe that this breadwinner will cooperate.

Those who oppose sanctions contend that economic growth, increased work opportunities for Africans, and attention to the social responsibilities of the South African subsidiaries of Western corporations will be more effective instruments for improving the lot of the Africans. This argument for meliorative action through investment can also be applied to the African homelands; two of which (Transkei and Bophuthatswana) are now sovereign states, at least in Pretoria's perspective. Direct investment in the African homelands by private white investors was originally ruled out under the apartheid policies of the late Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd, who argued that the African should look after his own capital accumulation and should not be exploited by outside whites. Such a Verwoerdian perspective ignored or denied the fact that African entrepreneurs do not have equal access to internal or external capital markets. African business tycoons in South Africa are a very rare species.<sup>15</sup>

The white rulers of South Africa have agonized over apartheid, a policy formulated pragmatically (bearing in mind the tolerance of the Afrikaner supporters of the National party, on the one hand, and the political impotence of the Africans, on the other), which was

often enunciated as though it had the doctrinal purity of Calvinist thought. Such cosmology inflicted a high cost in human unhappiness, economic deprivation, and civil repression, and some white South Africans have made their protest against apartheid known to the rest of the world.<sup>16</sup> South Africa's internal security system (BOSS) has established a reputation of sorts, having been featured alongside British security in Graham Greene's latest novel, *The Human Factor*. And the police force is diligent in enforcing the vast array of security laws, usually against Africans who are suspected of engaging in, or helping those involved in, guerrilla warfare in urban areas or in the countryside.<sup>17</sup>

#### THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE

If Namibia (as South-West Africa has come to be called) is regarded as an integral part of the South African empire, then it is certainly relevant to ask whether, how and when South Africa plans to lay down that burden.<sup>18</sup> When the German Empire was forced to lay down the burden of South-West Africa and its other African colonies as a result of its defeat in the First World War, it was hard to show much in the way of profit on the colonial balance sheet. When the South African government took over the administration of the territory, the terminology was changed to placate growing anti-imperialist sentiment; the burden then became "the sacred trust of civilization." South Africa was charged by the League of Nations Covenant with administering the territory as a League Mandate in a way that would advance the well-being of the territory's inhabitants.

Not surprisingly, the administrators built on some German foundations and added British as well as South African modes of governance, treating the Africans in one manner and the white inhabitants (the German settlers and the newly arrived South Africans, most of whom were Afrikaners) in another fashion, which permitted a wide latitude of self-government. With some exceptions, the South African philosophy and the practice of government in the mandated territory were condoned by the Permanent

<sup>16</sup>See for example Alan Paton, "A Patriot's Dilemma: Why I Stay in South Africa," *Commonweal*, vol. 105, no. 22 (November 10, 1978), pp. 714-715.

<sup>17</sup>See "Bannings and Detentions Drop Slightly," *The Star*, September 9, 1978, p. 7, and "Kruger Reveals Capture of 23 PAC Terrorists," *The Star*, November 25, 1978, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup>See L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1967, initially published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.).

<sup>19</sup>Still the best single source in English regarding the South African management of the territory during the League era is Robert L. Bradford, *The Origin and Concession of the League of Nations' Class "C" Mandate for South West Africa and Fulfillment of the Sacred Trust, 1919-1939* (New Haven: Yale University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1965).

Mandates Commission, a body of experts (not government representatives as such) responsible to the League of Nations for evaluating the performance of the mandatory powers, including South Africa, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Later, when Germany was reintegrated into the community of nations, a German also served on the Commission. The League days were halcyon days for South Africa, partly because the League mandate system was endowed with weak machinery and enforcement powers.<sup>19</sup> The League itself, primarily centered in Geneva, had only two black-ruled African states, Liberia and Ethiopia, and the so-called third world did not yet exist as a mobilizer of world opinion.

However, the signing of the Atlantic Charter by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1941 set in motion strong forces that were to witness the dissolution of Western empires in Asia and Africa. South Africa declined to participate in the decolonization exercise and claimed that she would continue to govern the territory of South-West Africa in the Wilsonian spirit of "the sacred trust of civilization." Her representatives at the League of Nations (which met in 1946 to give the defunct organization its final rites) and at the United Nations claimed that South Africa would consult all the inhabitants of the territory to ascertain their views on the future of the territory. The German section of the white community had, in large measure, been interned and/or shorn of its political rights; and the African inhabitants were not politicized to any appreciable degree. Thus the consultations favored the view that the territory should become a fifth province of South Africa. With the slow growth of what might be termed African protonationalism in the territory, the future of South-West Africa became a contentious issue that has remained on the agenda of the United Nations for more than three decades. Until the International Court of Justice delivered a close (8-7) decision in the twin cases of *Ethiopia v. South Africa* and *Liberia v. South Africa* in 1966, the battle for the control of South-West Africa had been fought in the international juridical arena. The African strategy, developed by the independent African states prior to the inception of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, was to have two former League of Nations member states (Liberia and Ethiopia) act as plaintiffs at the Interna-

(Continued on page 136)

**Richard Dale** is the coeditor (with Christian Potholm) of *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1972). He visited South-West Africa, Botswana and South Africa in 1970 and traveled in South Africa, South-West Africa and Zambia in the summer of 1976.

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*"The Rhodesian-Zimbabwean crisis will not be resolved by the civilian Rhodesian government, South Africa, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Cuba, or the front line states, acting in concert or unilaterally. The country's future is now in the hands of the military/civilian leadership of ZANU and ZAPU."*

## Rhodesia in Crisis

BY RICHARD W. HULL

*Associate Professor of African History, New York University*

**R**HODESIA today is two countries, not one. The Rhodesia governed by the multiracial transitional government is a slender corridor along the cool middle highlands, from Bulawayo eastward through Salisbury, the capital, to Umtali on the Mozambique border and south to Fort Victoria near the ruins at Great Zimbabwe. This is the white heartland. Nearly all other land, including the Tribal Trust Lands, some 85 percent of what is juridically called "Rhodesia," is controlled by guerrilla commanders of the armies of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo. On paper, the two movements are united under the banner of the Patriotic Front, formed in 1976. In reality, they are rival nationalist groupings struggling internally, against each other, and against the transitional Rhodesian government for supremacy in an independent Zimbabwe republic. Yet the world deals with Rhodesia as if it were still a California-sized nation of some seven million people under a multiracial transitional government.

The Rhodesian conflict began with the first guerrilla attack in December, 1972, but remained relatively small-scale until 1978. It greatly escalated after the March 3 internal settlement between white Prime Minister Ian Smith and three moderate black nationalists, Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National Council (UANC) and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of the African National Council (ANC), both American-educated, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization (ZUPO). The well-armed Patriotic Front, made up of Nkomo's movement based in Zambia and Mugabe's in Mozambique, was not a party to the settlement. The black leaders who signed the March agreement lacked independent military forces of their own and were therefore more interested in a peaceful, negotiated settlement with the white power structure than in armed conflict. Of the signers, only Bishop Muzorewa enjoyed a wide following, which was centered in Salisbury's black townships.

Broadly, the March agreement called for majority

rule based on universal adult suffrage, a black-majority legislature, an independent judiciary, and a bill of rights aimed mainly at protecting minority groups, specifically the whites. It naively called upon Joshua Nkomo of the Soviet-armed ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of Chinese-armed ZANU to cease fire, lay down their weapons and join the interim regime. The agreement established a transitional multiracial government and provided for the drafting of a constitution to serve a black majority Zimbabwean republic upon its anticipated accession to power on December 31, 1978. The transitional government contained two bodies: an Executive Council and a Council of Ministers. The Executive Council consisted of the four signers of the March agreement. One, Chief Chirau, represented conservative tribal authorities in the old Rhodesian government and was a Smith appointee. Nine whites and nine blacks were selected by the signers to serve as co-ministers in the biracial Cabinet, or Council of Ministers.

Under this internal settlement, 28 out of 100 parliamentary seats would be reserved for whites, who comprised less than three percent of the population but who controlled more than 80 percent of the nation's wealth. These white seats would be reserved for ten years or the lifetime of two Parliaments, whichever was longer. Whites would therefore possess enough votes to block any constitutional amendments detrimental to their entrenched privileges, like arbitrary seizures of property. Protection of private property has always been a *sine qua non* in Rhodesia.

The March agreement also called for constitutional guarantees against political interference in the civil service, the judiciary, the armed forces, and the police in order to assure the continuation of white control over those vital sectors. The institutions of power could therefore conceivably remain unchanged for at least a decade. Finally, the agreement envisioned national elections at the year's end and a clause preventing white groups from coalescing with any minority parties to form a government.

In some respects, the March agreement was a positive response to the 1977 Anglo-American plan,

which had set forth basic principles, including pre-independence elections based on universal suffrage, an independent black majority-ruled Zimbabwe, and a constitution based on a bill of rights. It was negotiated by anti-Marxist black and white leaders willing to prevent wholesale confiscations of private enterprise and property and to allow a gradual phaseout of white political power. They championed "one man one vote," democratic elections, a free press, the abolition of racial discrimination, and peaceful solutions to internal problems. Many of these leaders were educated in Great Britain and the United States and held democratic institutions in high regard. One would expect the Western powers, perhaps even the United Nations, to greet the multiracial internal settlement enthusiastically and to make every effort to support these men of peace. Naively, the signers and their aides were convinced that the West, the rest of Africa, and their own people would embrace the settlement.

But the settlement had several fatal flaws. It ran counter to the Anglo-American plan's demand that Ian Smith resign, that Rhodesia be disarmed and temporarily revert to the status of a British colony, that a British Commissioner be appointed to oversee the transition to majority rule, and that the Patriotic Front participate in the elections, supervised by United Nations forces. In other words, the Anglo-American plan called for the involvement of all parties in the transitional process, with none enjoying a predominant influence. That plan had been accepted by the Patriotic Front in 1977 as a basis for negotiation. Unfortunately, the British and the Americans, acting in concert with the front line states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), were unable to bring the parties together. All parties, including the white Rhodesians, distrusted the British and considered the Americans dangerously naive.

The Patriotic Front immediately labeled the March 3 settlement a fraud and a sellout by white racists and their black puppets. They protested that no formula was established for a referendum nor was there any test of acceptability by the majority of the population. The following day they replied to the call for a cease-fire by detonating several bombs in Salisbury's black neighborhoods, a source of Bishop Muzorewa's strength. Later, oil-rich Nigeria and the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) voiced their opposition to the agreement. Rather than trying to cooperate with the multiracial regime to gain diplomatic leverage, the United States blindly followed Britain's lead, ignoring the settlement and withholding any form of recognition. Thus, the United States lost an opportunity to guide Rhodesia toward independence peacefully and within a pro-Western context.

An expansion of guerrilla activity from the rural

areas to the towns and cities was soon apparent. Robert Mugabe of ZANU exclaimed that "guns and votes are inseparable partners. Accordingly, we demand that enemy forces must go out and our forces take over." Nkomo and Mugabe insisted they would agree to a cease-fire and national elections only after the Rhodesians surrendered power to their guerrilla armies.

Rhodesian air raids in 1977 on ZANU's Mozambique camps created chronic shortages of weapons and matériel. Facing the challenge of the internal settlement, Mugabe traveled to China and North Korea, his long-standing suppliers, for increased assistance. The trip was ill-timed and unsuccessful, because Peking had begun a dialogue with Washington, D.C., for resumption of diplomatic relations and did not want its involvement with liberation struggles in Africa to torpedo the Sino-American détente.

Mugabe returned to Mozambique and found a resurgence of unrest among his military commanders. A number of more radical ZANU soldiers in the liberation army were summarily arrested. The Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA), originally conceived to embrace the military commands of both ZANU and ZAPU, suffered internal strife in 1976. Thereafter, ZIPA fell into the ZANU framework, even though it continued to be racked by violent ethnic, tribal and ideological dissension. In this eruption, Mugabe was nearly overthrown.

Serious fissures also appeared in the transitional Rhodesian government. In April, Muzorewa, responding to white pressure, sacked his black co-Minister of Justice, Byron Hove, after only two weeks in office. Hove had refused to retract a statement critical of the white-dominated judiciary and the police. He demanded that his arch-conservative white counterpart agree that the judiciary and the police should be radically restructured to accelerate Africanization. Hove hit a sensitive chord. Clearly, the civil service was a potential embarrassment. Although more than half of Rhodesia's civil servants were black, less than 10 percent held decision-making positions, despite the fact that more than 10,000 black Rhodesians hold university degrees, far more than any other African nation on the eve of black majority rule. But Hove did not appreciate the government's dilemma: so many white civil servants holding tenured positions could not be fired without substantial compensation, which the financially pressed government could ill afford.

With the dismissal of Hove, Muzorewa suffered a severe loss of face. In an effort to regain respect for Muzorewa, to win over lukewarm guerrillas, and to achieve a cease-fire, the transitional government released nearly five hundred political detainees in early May. The effect was disappointing. Within weeks, rural missionary schools became prime guerrilla

targets. In incidents reminiscent of Mylai, teachers were massacred and students were kidnapped at gunpoint and forced into indoctrination camps. Many black civil servants were assassinated, including several Muzorewa aides who had gone to the countryside to seek rural support for the internal settlement.

ZANU's strategy of rural intimidation and politicization succeeded remarkably well. By mid-July, 1,650 rural schools had closed as well as scores of hospitals and African government councils. ZANU had also begun to organize widespread boycotts of cattle-dipping stations and the destruction of liquor stores and beer halls, all important sources of government revenue. Over the years, the government had attempted to isolate the peasantry from the guerrillas by establishing fenced and guarded "protected villages" modeled after America's Vietnamese program. Approximately 300,000 farmers were herded into some 270 such villages. On balance, the experiment proved unpopular and costly.

Rhodesia's most effective measures against the guerrilla invasions derive from her superior air power. Air attacks on guerrilla bases in Mozambique and Zambia were resumed on July 30, 1978, with a devastating strike against 10 ZANU camps deep inside Mozambique. For years, Rhodesia has been smuggling United States and British aircraft through international arms embargoes. Eleven United States-designed helicopters were smuggled through in December, 1978, to enhance the country's air strike capability.

Government efforts to win the war through legislative reform were less successful. The August 10 announcement of the end of legal racial discrimination in public facilities had little impact on black opinion, largely because few Africans could afford white accommodations or lived in their proximity.

#### THE AUGUST MEETINGS

In August, pro-Rhodesian elements in the United States succeeded in obtaining a congressional vote to lift sanctions if Ian Smith and his administration would negotiate with the Patriotic Front and would hold free and fair national elections. Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary David Owen, United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Nigerian diplomats, on the initiative of Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, secretly planned to draw the Patriotic Front into Smith's transitional government. The United States, eager for Nigeria's oil and goodwill, urged the Nigerians to participate in the scheme. On August 14 the four nations secretly negotiated a power-sharing arrangement between Smith and Nkomo of ZAPU. Nkomo, who has been on cordial terms with Reverend Sithole, was initially receptive. The plan was designed to install Western-leaning Nkomo as President of an independent Zimbabwe

and to relegate Mugabe, a fervent Marxist, to the number two post. Mugabe and the leaders of the front line states were not apprised of the scheme until five days later, when there was a follow-up secret meeting in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia and the headquarters of Nkomo's ZAPU movement.

Feeling betrayed, Mugabe refused to associate himself with the plan. The outcome was therefore a deepening of suspicions and distrust between the two wings of the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU), and between Kaunda, the host, and the leaders of the other front line states, particularly Presidents Samora Machel of Mozambique and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Machel and Nyerere, faithful supporters of Mugabe, were furious with Kaunda, who makes no secret of his support for Nkomo. They chastised him for entering into negotiations with the hated Ian Smith without first consulting the other members of the front line states. Mugabe viewed the scheme as another Machiavellian effort by Smith to divide the Patriotic Front and the front line states in order to buy more time to sell the internal settlement to the Rhodesian masses as well as to the Western world, particularly the United States.

The August meetings were a huge blunder for Anglo-American diplomacy. They embarrassed the Nigerians, humiliated Kaunda, enraged ZANU and the front line states and reduced the credibility of Joshua Nkomo. Nkomo's bourgeois life-style and his flirtations with elements in the Rhodesian regime and with the British capitalist "Tiny" Rowlands, head of the mining conglomerate Lonrho, caused all Marxists to have second thoughts about Nkomo's revolutionary ardor. The Cubans and Ethiopians quietly began to shift their support toward Mugabe, whose brand of revolution and scientific socialism more closely resembles their own.

By September, it had become obvious that the internal settlement Smith had reached in March with Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau could not be the basis of the government of a united and independent Zimbabwe. It was equally clear that relations between Mugabe and Nkomo, always fragile, had so deteriorated that it seemed unlikely that the Patriotic Front could unite enough to form a coalition government.

Nkomo and Smith needed an incident to restore their credibility to their partisans. It came on September 5 when guerrillas shot down an Air Rhodesia civilian passenger plane and then killed 10 out of 18 defenseless survivors. Nkomo assumed responsibility for the atrocity, white Rhodesian opinion was outraged, and the two leaders engaged in mutual recriminations. The spirit of the August meetings had completely evaporated. Moreover, those meetings made it extremely difficult for the British and Americans to deal later with the Patriotic Front.

With no end of the war in sight, and with the approaching rainy season, Smith declared martial law in parts of the country on September 10 and cracked down on the internal branches of ZAPU and ZANU. Two days later, Nkomo publicly rejected the Anglo-American proposal for an all-parties conference. All diplomatic initiatives had reached a dead end.

In the same week, Nkomo and Mugabe, separately, flew to Addis Ababa, capital of Marxist Ethiopia, to negotiate with Cuba's Fidel Castro for military support. On October 2 the Rhodesian government banned the country's only black newspaper, the *Zimbabwe Times*. Popular African sentiment was moving further away from the transitional regime.

The Rhodesian kaleidoscope turned again on October 6 when President Kaunda announced the official reopening of Zambia's rail link with South Africa, via Rhodesia Railways. Zambia was approaching fiscal collapse. Copper, which accounts for 90 percent of that nation's export earnings, was selling at a 25-year low on world markets. Moreover, land-locked Zambia was encountering difficulties in her foreign trade. The Benguela railway to Angolan ports had been shut down by a civil war in Angola since August, 1975. And the Chinese-built Tazara railway to Tanzania's port of Dar es Salaam was plagued by locomotive breakdowns and an unstable roadbed. To top it off, Dar's harbor was congested, creating long and costly delays. Thus, unofficially, Zambia had been sending ore by rail across Rhodesia to South Africa's port of East London, despite the official closure of the Rhodesian-Zambian frontier in January, 1973. By October, 1978, the rains had begun and Zambia desperately needed maize and fertilizer. Food shortages put political pressure on Kaunda, who was about to stand (unopposed) for reelection but who feared he would not fare well at the polls.

Kaunda rationalized that sufficient supplies of fertilizer could reach Zambia before the planting season only by rail from South Africa. President Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania angrily disagreed. Kaunda's agonizing and humiliating decision only led to deeper divisions among the front line states. Yet the reopening of the rail link was welcomed by many Zambians as the only way to revive the paralyzed economy and its hungry citizens.

Zambians were also annoyed by the growing military presence of ZAPU. ZAPU's army was larger and better equipped than Zambia's armed forces. And its guerrillas intimidated local political leaders and raided farms for food. Although they did not admit it, radical guerrilla cadres began to sabotage freight trains carrying goods into and out of Rhodesia. Not surprisingly, Zambia offered no resistance to a series of destructive Rhodesian air attacks launched on October 21 against Zambian-based ZAPU camps. The daylight raids penetrated deep into Zambian

territory, hitting 12 military/refugee camps, killing hundreds, and destroying food, ammunition, and equipment. Kaunda used the raids to his advantage, for Great Britain immediately airlifted defensive weapons to Zambia's military in response to Kaunda's turn to Cuba and the Soviets for support.

Meanwhile, the political and economic situation inside Rhodesia continued to deteriorate. The black leaders in the transitional government failed to break their dependency on the white power structure and were appearing as mouthpieces of their white co-leaders. Muzorewa, who in March commanded upward of 200,000 at political rallies, was attracting dwindling members in late October. Sithole and Chirau were never able to garner popular support. No one seemed impressed that by the October rains, when guerrillas are able to live off the land and find protection in the bush, many of the toughest demands originally forwarded by the front line states and the British and Americans had been met. The last-ditch October visit to the United States by the signers of the internal settlement failed to win wide support or sympathy from the U.S. Congress or the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Instead, the visit reduced the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the Patriotic Front, whose leaders were enraged over the granting of visas to the Rhodesians, because they mistakenly viewed the visas as tantamount to official recognition.

#### THE ECONOMY

Rhodesia's once robust economy began to nose dive. In February, 1978, the rising cost of war had forced the government to boost the sales tax from 10 to 15 percent, to demand a wage freeze of 5 percent, and to raise the income tax rate by 10 percent. The war was costing the Rhodesian government some \$1.3 million daily by midyear, fully two-fifths of the country's revenue. Public debt also mounted precipitously. Before 1978, expenditures were met by government borrowing rather than by increasing the general level of taxation. In September, the government imposed an unpopular 12.5 percent "National Defence Levy," in effect a mandatory loan from taxpayers. Moreover, large blocs of precious stocks were sold and loans were negotiated at exorbitant rates with South African, Swiss and other institutions.

Rhodesia's economy has also suffered negative economic growth in real terms since 1975. The domestic product fell 6.9 percent in 1977 and somewhat more than 7.5 percent in 1978. Eighty percent of the economy is dependent on white-controlled and white-managed mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The government relies heavily on exports of meat, tobacco and fruit to finance the war effort. Rhodesia not only feeds herself but has sold large quantities of beef to black-ruled nations like Zaire and

Gabon. In 1977, the country's 5,000 or so white farmers produced nearly 85 percent of the \$705 million agricultural output. Before 1978, Rhodesia produced more food than all the front line states combined. If the white farmers were to panic and abruptly abandon their farms, the country would face a calamitous food shortage. Moreover, the white farms employed 38 percent of all black wage earners.

Tragically, over the decades two-thirds of the country's black population has been forced to live in overcrowded, overgrazed Tribal Trust Lands. Most of them exist at a bare subsistence level; they produce proportionately less food for themselves and rely increasingly on the more technically advanced white agricultural sector for food. In 1890, on the eve of the European conquest of Matabeleland and Mashonaland (now Rhodesia), the Africans were more self-sufficient in food than they are today.

Despite the passage of a law in February, 1978, opening agricultural land to blacks, the white population still holds title to nearly half the country's land area. Unlike Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe has called for the confiscation and nationalization of this land and its return to African occupation and control. This position has won him peasant support.

Rhodesia is also confronted with a growing manpower shortage that causes serious economic dislocations, particularly in the manufacturing sector. This is exacerbated by demands for military personnel and by the accelerating emigration of young and middle-aged white skilled artisans, managers and professionals. Rhodesia's net white emigration in 1978 reached a record high, with over 14,000 leaving. As 1979 opened, the white population had dropped to an estimated 225,000, more than two-thirds clustered in the cities of Salisbury and Bulawayo. Approximately half of all Rhodesia's whites settled in the country after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, and close to 70 percent were born elsewhere. Altogether, blacks outnumber whites by nearly 24 to 1, and the black population is growing at the rate of 250,000 a year. Thus, in a generation or two, the race problem would probably have taken care of itself. Even today, these statistics should make power-sharing between the races a moot question.

The transitional government has avoided a general mobilization for fear of accelerating the white exodus. Already they have extended call-ups to 50-year-olds. As an alternative, they chose on September 16 to draft Africans. The effect has been minimal because the Rhodesian army was already four-fifths black, made up of well-paid and well-fed volunteers. In addition, more than 60 percent of the police force is black. By mid-1978, the armed forces numbered over 30,000 whites, blacks, mixed-race, Asians and foreign mercenaries.

The exhausting, inconclusive war, begun in Decem-

ber, 1972, also weakened white resolve. Morale was further eroded by the disclosure that a few highly respected white Rhodesians had diverted millions of dollars of precious government military funds to private Swiss bank accounts.

With the onset of the rains in late October, 1978, the war moved into high gear. ZANU rapidly established liberated zones within the Tribal Trust Lands. At year's end, more than two-thirds of the local councils, the basic unit of African government, were inoperative, superseded by guerrilla military command posts. An estimated 10,000 ZANU guerrillas and 1,500 ZAPU counterparts held some 85 percent of the countryside. ZANU has eclipsed ZAPU as the main guerrilla force operating inside the country, even though ZAPU is better trained and equipped and more disciplined.

The rapid expansion of both guerrilla forces caused territorial overlapping and violent clashes between ZANU and ZAPU. Nearly as many guerrillas have died fighting each other as have perished fighting Rhodesian security forces.

By January, 1979, security, law and order had collapsed in much of Rhodesia. Many "protected villages" have been destroyed by ZANU guerrillas, forcing their inhabitants to flee to more secure urban centers. Nearly 1 million of the country's 6.8 million Africans have been uprooted by either the Rhodesian security forces or the liberationists. More than half the country lives under virtually unrestricted martial law, and civilian traffic between towns must often move in militarily escorted convoys.

The internal settlement failed to win the hearts and minds of the rural masses, especially those living in the Tribal Trust Lands. On November 16, the transitional government postponed the transfer of power to majority rule from December 31, 1978, to late April, 1979. This was a humiliating admission of defeat for the internal settlement. Nevertheless, the rapidly deteriorating situation in the countryside did not deter the government from announcing a new framework on November 30, giving whites 28 percent of the Cabinet posts for the first five years of majority rule. The committee charged with drafting the new constitution

(Continued on page 137)

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**Richard W. Hull** has traveled extensively in Africa since 1961 under a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and grants from the New York State Department of Education and New York University. In 1974, he wrote, produced, and narrated for CBS television a 47-part series entitled "African Civilizations," which was broadcast in this country, Canada, and Africa. He is the author of numerous books, including *African Cities and Towns before the European Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976) and *Munyakare: African Civilization* (New York: Wiley, 1973).

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*"Several Arab and African states mistrust the outsiders' objectives in Africa; the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopia has heightened that apprehension. At the same time, Soviet and Cuban interests in Ethiopia, more particularly in Eritrea, are in all probability dissimilar; thus, potential Soviet-Cuban disagreement over policy may in fact occur."*

## The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia

BY DANIEL S. PAPP

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia Institute of Technology*

**O**N November 20, 1978, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation formalizing the political, economic and military ties that had been growing stronger during the past two years. The treaty was the culmination of a major political turnaround in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, formerly an American client, had taken still another step along a pro-Soviet path, while Somalia, Ethiopia's neighboring rival for disputed territory in the Ogaden Desert of southern Ethiopia, was further alienated from the Kremlin by the new Soviet-Ethiopian treaty. Indeed, only a year earlier, Somalia herself had been linked with the Soviet Union in a treaty very similar to the one which today links Moscow and Addis Ababa.

Closer relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia have been paralleled by increasingly close ties between Ethiopia and the rest of the socialist bloc, most notably Cuba. Ethiopia relied on Soviet arms and Cuban military personnel during the recent Ethiopian-Somali border war over the Ogaden Desert; when Ethiopian forces finally reached the Somali border in mid-March, 1978, over \$1 billion in Soviet military equipment was being used and 17,000 Cuban soldiers and advisers were assisting the Ethiopians.<sup>1</sup>

Why have the Soviet Union and Cuba offered such wholehearted support to the Ethiopian government? Why was the Kremlin willing to jeopardize, and eventually lose, its close relationship with Somalia in exchange for an originally more tenuous relationship with Ethiopia? Are Moscow's interests in Ethiopia identical to Havana's interests, or may the two socialist countries in fact have different objectives in the Horn of Africa?

Ethiopia's changed international political posture cannot be understood except in the context of her domestic turmoil. It is also difficult to comprehend Soviet and Cuban policies in the Horn without taking into account events within the African nation.

Three separate crises in Ethiopia have had a visible

impact on Ethiopia's international political posture and on Soviet and Cuban policies in the area. These crises are internal political, economic, and social reforms; the Eritrean insurgency; and the Ogaden conflict.

Before September 12, 1974, Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie, the same Selassie who some 40 years earlier had appealed to the League of Nations to save his Ethiopian empire from the invading Italians. After World War II, the "Conquering Lion of Judah" regained his empire but, except for some limited social reforms, he did little to reorganize the predominantly feudal economic and social structure of the Ethiopian state. By 1974, the Emperor's government was rife with corruption, inefficiency, and apparent disregard for the welfare and well-being of the Ethiopian people. Indeed, during 1973 and 1974, a massive famine swept Ethiopia, killing over a million people, while the Emperor's government did little to alleviate the disaster.

During the spring of 1974, growing army unrest and mutinies in several garrisons forced Selassie to replace his government, draft a new constitution, and promise a major land reform program. These steps quieted unrest for a time, but hostility toward the Emperor had grown too strong. On September 12, Selassie was deposed, and a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) assumed power.

PMAC, also known as the Dergue, was itself beset by a conflict between its radical and moderate elements. Two and one-half years of political infighting, assassination and intrigue within the Dergue finally ended on February 3, 1977, when Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged preeminent after a shoot-out among members of PMAC.

Throughout this period, the Dergue implemented policies to destroy Ethiopia's feudal system and to establish socialism. As early as December, 1974, the new government declared that it sought to transform the country into a socialist state with a one-party system, collective farms, and government control of all productive property. On April 21, 1976, PMAC announced a political program centered on the formal

<sup>1</sup>Godwin Matatu, "Ethiopia's Finest Hour," *Africa*, no. 79 (March, 1978), pp. 19-20; and "Carter in Nigeria for Three-Day State Visit," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1978, p. 1.

adoption of "scientific socialism." Since then, the Dergue has emphasized government control of the economy, centralized political control, nationalization of property, and the creation of a "new Ethiopia."<sup>2</sup>

Needless to say, these revolutionary attempts to change Ethiopia's socioeconomic struggle evoked considerable opposition on the left and the right. On the left, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary party, a self-styled Marxist group opposed to military rule, conducted anti-Dergue activity in Addis Ababa itself. On the right, the conservative royalist Ethiopian Democratic Union fought PMAC's rule. Neither extreme could legitimately claim widespread public support; instead, each extreme represented narrow political and economic segments of society. Nevertheless, the domestic turmoil aroused by the Dergue's revolutionary domestic policies and the opposition to those policies seriously undermined the fabric of Ethiopian society.

### THE ERITREAN INSURGENCY

While the struggle over domestic social and economic reforms was clearly of great importance to PMAC, it was only one of the challenges faced by Mengistu Haile Mariam's young government. An equally important challenge existed in Eritrea, Ethiopia's northernmost province and her only direct access to the sea. For this reason alone, Eritrea is of considerable importance to Ethiopia. Eritrean nationalists have long sought full independence for the predominantly Muslim province, which was not fully incorporated into the predominantly Christian Ethiopian state until 1962. As early as 1946, the Muslim League was created and demanded full independence for Eritrea, which at that time was being administered by the British military.<sup>3</sup>

British administration ended in 1952, when Eritrea became an autonomous federated province of Ethiopia. Between 1952 and 1962, when Eritrea was fully

<sup>2</sup>For assessments of the Dergue's various domestic policies, see Gerard Chaliand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," *Foreign Policy*, no. 30 (Spring, 1978), pp. 117-119; and William F. Lee, "Ethiopia: A Review of the Dergue," *Africa Report*, vol. 22, no. 2 (March-April, 1977), pp. 7-11.

<sup>3</sup>Other Eritrean political movements at the time included the predominantly Christian "Unionist Party," which favored integration with Ethiopia, and the Christian-Muslim "Liberal Progressive party," which supported a loose Eritrean federation with Ethiopia. See Chaliand, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-25; and "The Eritrean Conflict: A Background Paper," *Africa Currents*, no. 7 (Autumn 76-Winter 77), p. 15 (hereafter cited, "Eritrean Conflict").

<sup>4</sup>Quoted in Tom J. Farer, "Dilemmas on the Horn," *Africa Report*, vol. 22, no. 2 (March-April, 1977), p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Selassie himself was greeted extremely cordially when he traveled to the Soviet Union in 1959, 1967, 1970, and 1973. See, for example, "Joint Soviet-Ethiopian Communiqué," *Pravda*, March 3, 1967, p. 1; and "On the Stay in the USSR of Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia," *Pravda*, November 1, 1973, p. 1.

incorporated into Ethiopia, Eritrean political refugees fled to neighboring states and set up the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Cairo. The 1962 union strengthened the predominantly Muslim front, which eventually relocated in Damascus.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the ELF's traditionalist Muslim leanings were increasingly questioned by the Front's Christian and radical members. In 1970, the predominantly Christian Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), itself Marxist oriented, split from the ELF. For the next four years, the two liberation movements battled each other as well as Haile Selassie's forces. Despite these difficulties, by 1974, the movement's military gains were so significant that one prominent observer of African affairs visited Eritrea and declared that "there can no longer be any serious hope of defeating the rebels by force."<sup>4</sup>

While much of the success of the ELF and EPLF should be credited to the movements themselves, it was also evident that both groups received extensive external support from Muslim states and from Communist states. The Muslim states—the Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—viewed the insurrection primarily as an Arab movement. Communist supporters—primarily Cuba, which at least between 1967 and 1971 trained ELF troops in the Caribbean country—apparently viewed the Eritrean separatists as tools by means of which the pro-American Selassie regime could be embarrassed. It is important to note, however, that the Soviet Union itself maintained extremely cordial relations with the Emperor until he was deposed.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, by the time the Dergue assumed power in late 1974, a divided national liberation movement, one wing predominantly Arab and the other predominantly Christian-Marxist, was extending its control in Eritrea. Radical Arab states and some Communist states supported the divided movement even though the Soviet Union remained aloof, maintained cordial relations with Ethiopia and supported Ethiopia's territorial integrity.

The Dergue itself quickly adopted a two-sided policy toward the Eritrean insurgency. On the one hand, PMAC occasionally indicated a desire to reach a political settlement, including Eritrean autonomy within an Ethiopian federation. On the other hand, the new Ethiopian governing body also showed its willingness to use military force to compel Eritrea to remain within the Ethiopian union. For their parts, the ELF and EPLF also presented two faces, on occasion accepting the concept of federation, but for the most part seeking independence through military action. Indeed, even today, both sides publicly proclaim their willingness to negotiate, but in actuality they seek a military resolution to the conflict.

A third Ethiopian crisis—the Ogaden conflict—interjected yet additional complicating factors into the

already confused Eritrean situation. The Ogaden conflict itself was a vestige of nineteenth-century colonialism in the Horn of Africa. During the nineteenth century, three European powers—Great Britain, Italy, and France—and one African state—Ethiopia—laid claim to various lands in the African Horn inhabited primarily by Somali-speaking nomads. In 1960, Italian and British Somalia received independence and became the state of Somalia. In 1977, French Somalia was granted independence, becoming Djibouti. Meanwhile, the territory Ethiopia claimed had become—and remains—an integral part of Ethiopia. This territory consists mostly of the Ogaden Desert in southern Ethiopia.

In 1969, General Mohammed Siad Barre staged a coup in Somalia. One of the objectives of his new government, Siad Barre gave notice, was to unify all the lands inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples. These lands included territory in French Somalia, Kenya and, of course, Ethiopia. Tension between Ethiopia and Somalia was heightened by two factors. Somalia actively supported the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which had units operating in the Ogaden Desert; and Siad Barre's government increasingly adopted a pro-Soviet posture, culminating in the "Somali-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" signed in 1974, as opposed to the Ethiopian government's pro-American posture during Selassie's reign. Although there was no open fighting until 1977, the stage was set for conflict between Ethiopian and Somali forces.

#### IMPROVING SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS

When the Dergue came to power in 1974, Soviet-Ethiopian relations were cordial but not close. While Soviet military aid to Somalia after Somalia's inde-

<sup>6</sup>Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970), p. 336.

<sup>7</sup>Tass, April 22, 1976, as reported in *FBIS Soviet Union*, April 23, 1976, p. H2; B. Pilyatskin, "Guidelines of the New Ethiopia," *Izvestia*, May 6, 1976, p. 3; "Awakening of the People," *Pravada*, May 16, 1976, p. 5; and B. Pilyatskin, "Colonialism is Doomed," *Izvestia*, May 23, 1976, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>Peter Osnos, "Ethiopian Forms Alliance with Soviets, Capping Visit," *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1977, p. 9; and Peter Enahaco, "Mengistu's Move Puts Moscow on a Tight Rope," *Africa*, no. 70 (June, 1977), p. 35.

<sup>9</sup>It should be noted that this declaration fell far short of the Treaty of Friendship which the Soviet Union had with Somalia at this time. See Osnos, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup>David Ottaway, "Somali Leader Calls Soviet Arms for Ethiopia a Danger," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1977, p. A13; and David Ottaway, "Soviets Try to Keep Close Ties with Somalia, South Yemen," *Washington Post*, May 26, 1977, p. A28.

Somali President Siad Barre commented on the meeting, declaring "unfortunately no agreement was reached. President Castro was equipped with all possible goodwill to find agreement but our Ethiopian friends were rich in a mentality of colonialism and territorial aggrandizement." See Enahaco, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

pendence in 1960 strained the "excellent relations" which Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev claimed existed between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia,<sup>6</sup> the two countries maintained good relations up until Selassie's removal in September, 1974. Indeed, five months before he was deposed, the Emperor visited a Soviet destroyer berthed at the Eritrean port of Massawa to celebrate Ethiopian Naval Day.

Soviet reaction to Selassie's removal was at first cautious, and was limited primarily to factual accounts of ongoing events. It was not until the Dergue unveiled its political program on April 21, 1976—a full 19 months after Selassie was deposed—that the Kremlin moved to improve its relations with the new Ethiopian government significantly. After the publication of the Dergue's political program, the Soviet Union proclaimed that PMAC was leading a "national democratic revolution" and had become an "active participant in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle."<sup>7</sup> Other indications of Soviet-Ethiopian intimacy followed, capped in December, 1976, by a secret military assistance agreement estimated by some observers to total at least \$100 million in aid.<sup>8</sup> Finally, three months after Mengistu survived the February, 1977, shoot-out that solidified his hold on power, the Ethiopian strongman traveled to the Kremlin and concluded a "Declaration on the Foundation for Relationships and Cooperation" with the Soviets.<sup>9</sup> This journey occurred less than two weeks after the Dergue ordered the American military mission and other United States officials to leave.

While improved Soviet-Ethiopian ties pleased the Kremlin, they also created policy problems for the Soviet leaders. Could Moscow maintain its influence in Somalia, which was actively seeking to wrest the Ogaden Desert from Ethiopia, while it improved its relations with the Dergue? If Moscow did not extend military aid to the Dergue, then Eritrea would almost certainly attain independence; but if Moscow did extend aid, Soviet relations with Somalia would be jeopardized. Additionally, Soviet aid to Ethiopia against the Eritreans would place Soviet leaders in direct opposition to movements strongly supported by Syria and Iraq, who themselves transshipped Soviet arms to the Eritreans.

A joint Soviet-Cuban proposal for a Somalia-Ethiopia-Djibouti alliance, including an autonomous Eritrea within the federation, may best be viewed in light of these potential policy contradictions. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro himself made the proposal during a secret meeting in Aden attended by Castro, Mengistu, and Siad Barre in March, 1977. Although Somalia rejected the federation concept,<sup>10</sup> the idea itself underlined both the opportunities and the difficulties that confronted Moscow—and increasingly Cuba—in the African Horn. A successful federation would guarantee Soviet influence throughout the

Horn. That the federation was rejected boded ill for the continued success of the Soviet balancing act between Ethiopia and Somalia.

### THE SOVIET-CUBAN BUILDUP

By June, 1977, Soviet policy toward the Horn of Africa reached a critical stage. While the Kremlin had obviously improved its position in Addis Ababa, its new client was far from secure. Domestic reforms opened the way for the new Soviet-Ethiopian intimacy but reduced the Dergue's stability. In Eritrea, the ELF and EPLF controlled 90 percent of the province and were gradually extending that control. In the Ogaden Desert, units of the WSLF were stepping up their activity. With events apparently coming to a head, reports began surfacing that Cuban military advisers had been seen in Addis Ababa and in Asmara, the Eritrean capital.

The United States State Department had reported as early as May that 50 Cuban advisers were training Ethiopians for combat. By late July, another report placed 3,000 Cubans in Ethiopia, and quoted one Eritrean Liberation Front officer (who himself had been trained in Cuba) as saying, "All my feelings about Cuba have changed. I hate them and the Russians, too."

A new factor had thus appeared. Whereas previously Cuba had trained Eritrean separatists and sought to undermine Addis Ababa's control of the strategic province, she now supported Addis Ababa and opposed the Eritreans. Castro rationalized this turnabout by declaring the Dergue a "genuinely progressive force" and claiming that the Eritreans were now acting for an "international reactionary conspiracy" of conservative Arab states including Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and Egypt, a claim that the Soviet Union had voiced earlier.

The deteriorating Ethiopian position in Eritrea was soon overshadowed by the conflict in the Ogaden. During the late summer and early fall of 1977, the

<sup>11</sup>Expulsion from their facilities at Berbera must have been particularly painful to Soviet leaders. In addition to losing access to airfields from which they could reconnoiter the Indian Ocean, they also lost a naval complex which included a deep-water port, housing for 1,500, communications facilities, storage capacity for 175 thousand barrels of fuel, and handling and storage facilities for tactical missiles. For the expulsion statement issued by Somali Minister of Information and National Guidance Abdi Kassim Salad on behalf of the Central Committee of the Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party, see *FBIS Sub-Saharan Africa*, November 14, 1977, pp. B2-3.

<sup>12</sup>This information was released in a special edition of the official Cuban newspaper *Granma* on March 14, 1978. See "Havana Acknowledges Military Role in Ethiopia," *The New York Times*, March 15, 1978, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup>Matatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup>For an excellent discussion of these differences, see "Ethiopia I: The EPLF Blooms in Eritrea," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 19, no. 5 (March 3, 1978), pp. 1-3.

WSLF, supported by units from the regular Somali army, launched an offensive that swept across the Ogaden Desert. By November, Somali and WSLF forces controlled most of the disputed region. Throughout this period, Soviet and Cuban military aid to the Dergue slowly accelerated. Rumors circulated that the Kremlin had authorized the shipment of 48 Mig-21's to Ethiopia, and the United States Department of State reported that 150 Cubans and 100 Russians were advising the Dergue in its military efforts in Eritrea and the Ogaden. In response to these and other indications of Soviet-Cuban support for Ethiopia, Somali President Siad Barre expelled all Soviet and Cuban advisers, ordered Soviet withdrawal from strategic Somali, naval and air facilities, and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.<sup>11</sup>

An Ethiopian counteroffensive began in mid-January, 1978. Ethiopian forces carried out most operations but in many cases, even as early as January 22, Cuban forces played significant combat roles.<sup>12</sup> Cuban forces in Ethiopia eventually totaled 17,000 men. Most important, however, a massive three-month Soviet military airlift that began in mid-December carried over \$1-billion worth of military equipment to the Ethiopian and Cuban forces. Soviet Antonov-22's brought 600 armored vehicles, 60 Mig-21's, two squadrons of Mig-23's, numerous T-54 tanks, and over 400 pieces of assorted artillery to the hard-pressed nation.<sup>13</sup> By late March, 1978, Siad Barre announced that Somali forces would be withdrawn from the desert. Although the WSLF continued to fight on in a guerrilla mode, the Ogaden War was for all practical purposes over.

The Eritrean conflict, however, continued. During the Ogaden War, the Eritrean rebels placed both Massawa and Asmara under siege and further extended their control of the countryside. Using the Maoist slogan, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Eritrean national movements organized peasants into local militia units armed with captured Soviet and American weapons. Although the movements remained divided by ideological, policy, and personal differences,<sup>14</sup> they nearly succeeded in wresting control of the province from Addis Ababa.

The Dergue, however, had not conceded defeat in Eritrea; the Ogaden War had simply become its leading priority. Indeed, throughout the desert conflict, reports continued that Ethiopian units in Eritrea were receiving increased aid and advice from their Soviet and Cuban allies. Following the Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden, Cuban forces were "apparently" turning their attention to Eritrea. By mid-April, Eritrean spokesmen claimed that over 3,000 Cubans were in Eritrea, and that Cuban fighter pilots joined Ethiopian ground forces on April 24 in an attack attempting to break the Asmara siege.

Increased Soviet and Cuban involvement in the

Ogaden and Eritrea was accompanied by close consultation among senior Soviet, Cuban, and Ethiopian political and defense leaders. In December, 1977, Admiral of the Soviet Navy S.G. Gorshkov conferred with Cuban leaders in Havana, and the following month, according to one report, Soviet Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov and several Soviet generals went to Addis Ababa. In February, 1978, Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro traveled to Moscow where he met with President Leonid Brezhnev and other senior Soviet military and political officials. Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca Peoli went to Ethiopia in March and to the Soviet Union in April, while Mengistu himself visited both Moscow and Havana in April. While the subjects of these various discussions are not known, it is reasonable to assume that they dealt with Ethiopia's twin crises in Eritrea and the Ogaden, and with how Soviet and Cuban support would be used to combat the crises. Western sources speculated that Mengistu's travels sought to influence both Brezhnev and Castro to increase their support to the Ethiopian offensive in Eritrea.

Soviet commentary on both crises has increasingly blurred the distinctions between the Eritrean and Ogaden situations. Western and reactionary Arab states are allegedly working to undermine Ethiopian national integrity "now that there is a national democratic revolution taking place in Ethiopia" by encouraging "international counterrevolution and all kinds of separatists."<sup>15</sup> According to *Pravda*, Ethiopia's "multinational character" was being used by imperialist powers to "dismember the country."<sup>16</sup> At the same time, the Kremlin tried to discredit the legitimacy of the Eritrean separatist movements and to make it appear that these movements were "in someone else's game," to borrow a Soviet phrase.<sup>17</sup> This was paralleled by a similar Cuban effort, made the more striking by Cuba's earlier open support for the separatists.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, when Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca ended his March trip to Ethiopia, he affirmed that his government gave "total support" to the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.<sup>19</sup> Ideologically, the groundwork had been set for another major intervention.

Perhaps surprisingly, no major intervention oc-

curred. Soviet aid to Ethiopia remained significant; during the first six months of 1978 alone, the Soviet Union sent 61,000 tons of military equipment to Ethiopia, constructed military airfields currently being used against the Eritrean separatists, and moved a floating drydock from Berbera to an island near Massawa. Meanwhile, Soviet advisers reportedly planned numerous Ethiopian operations. Cubans flew bombing and strafing missions against the Eritrean rebels, and provided major logistic support. The degree of Cuban involvement in ground fighting has not reached significant levels, although Eritrean forces claim they have often fought Cuban troops.

Why has Soviet-Cuban involvement remained limited in Eritrea? One of the more significant considerations is the success of the Ethiopian forces. The rebellion maximized its area of control in late April, and since then it has been losing territory. In late July, Ethiopian forces finally broke the siege of Asmara. Several other key Eritrean cities also fell to the Dergue's forces. In mid-November, 1978, Ethiopian forces launched what Mengistu described as the "final offensive" against the Eritrean rebels. Within two weeks, the Ethiopians had driven the secessionists from Keren, their last stronghold. Despite their setbacks, the rebels vowed to fight on, and even reported killing a Soviet general who was directing the Ethiopians in their November offensive.

The Eritrean conflict has not ended despite recent Ethiopian military successes, but will probably continue, with the Eritreans reverting to guerrilla tactics. The probability of continued conflict presents both the Soviet Union and Cuba with policy alternatives that must be viewed within a broader context.

#### ETHIOPIA AND THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION

Soviet and Cuban policies toward Africa have multiple objectives which, in the Soviet case, have been described as: gaining a voice in African affairs, thereby spreading the Kremlin's political and economic influence; promoting Moscow's international security interests, particularly by obtaining African support facilities that would ease the logistical problem of maintaining Soviet naval units in African waters;

(Continued on page 129)

<sup>15</sup>V. Kudryavstev, "Dark Spots on the Globe," *Nedelia*, no. 4 (January, 1978), p. 5. See also V. Korovikov, "On Events in the Horn of Africa," *Pravda*, January 26, 1978, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup>A. Serbin, "In the Interests of Unity," *Pravda*, March 15, 1978, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup>See, for example, "Ethiopia: The Unknown Revolution I," *Granma*, February 5, 1978, p. 17; and "Ethiopia: The Unknown Revolution II," *Granma*, February 12, 1978, p. 26.

<sup>19</sup>Text of the Cuban-Ethiopian Communiqué issued at the conclusion of Foreign Minister Malmierca's trip to Ethiopia, as quoted in *FBIS Latin America*, March 27, 1978, p. Q1.

**Daniel S. Papp** has recently been research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College and has been a visiting lecturer at the Western Australia Institute of Technology in Perth, Australia. He has published articles on Soviet foreign policy and resources policy in *International Journal*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Parameters*, *Resources Policy*, and *Soviet Union*, and has recently completed a manuscript entitled "Vietnam: The Perspective from Three Capitals."

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*"Far and away the most promising regional development in Africa in 1978 was the rapprochement between Zaire and Angola and, in its wake, the healing of old wounds among Zaire, Angola and Zambia."*

## The Central African States

BY KENNETH L. ADELMAN

*Consultant, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute*

THE Central African states of Zaire, Zambia, and Angola stand at the crossroads of the African continent and at the focal point of intensive controversy, because of the highly fluid and volatile nature of their three regimes and the intrinsic importance of the region as a whole. Politically the area is a mosaic of geopolitical alignments and has been subject to considerable outside intervention. Zaire is firmly pro-West and staunchly hostile to the Cubans and Soviets; Zambia has traditionally been close to the West but seems to agree with the Communist powers on the paramount issue of Rhodesia; and Angola is tied to the Soviet Union by cooperative security pacts and is highly dependent upon Cuban troops and assistance of various types.

Strategically, the three states (along with Tanzania) form a belt cutting across the entire continent and separating the explosive southern area—including Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa—from the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa. With Cuban forces occupying Angola, French-Moroccan-African troops rescuing Zaire, and considerable Soviet assistance to the Rhodesian guerrilla forces stationed in Zambia, the region has become a focus of obvious East-West rivalry. Economically, the area has vast potential wealth but suffers from dire economic conditions. Zaire is basically capitalistic, with some state ownership; Angola has adopted a Marxist economy (though she still allows free enterprise, notably in oil exploitation); and Zambia has fashioned a type of African socialism. Linguistically, the states again span the horizon, with Zaire predominantly French-speaking, Zambia, English-speaking, and Angola, Portuguese. Culturally, each state contains a panoply of rich tribal traditions and customs.

Far and away the most promising regional development in Africa in 1978 was the rapprochement between Zaire and Angola and, in its wake, the healing of old wounds in Zaire, Angola and Zambia. Over the years, bad blood flowed between Zaire's President (Joseph) Mobutu Sese Seko and MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) leader and later Angolan President Agostinho Neto. Before the April, 1974, coup began to unravel the Portuguese colonial empire, Mobutu attempted a daring balancing act,

serving as mediator among the three Angolan liberation factions and as prime supporter of one faction, the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola). Eventually he failed on both scores, but meanwhile he deeply offended the MPLA. Agreements involving Mobutu, Neto and FNLA leader Holden Roberto were solemnly made and expeditiously broken in October, 1966, December, 1973, and July, 1974. During the large-scale Angolan civil war, Mobutu strongly backed the feeble FNLA and rendered assistance to UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) and FLEC (fighting for the "independence" of the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda) to boot.

In February, 1976, Zaire and the newly independent Angolan government signed an agreement to normalize relations. Mobutu allegedly consented to stop assisting the three opposition groups and Neto reportedly agreed to return the Katangan refugees (who had fled from Zaire in the early 1960's and had lived in Angola ever since, fighting alongside the MPLA during the war). Nothing resulted from this accord and relations between Mobutu and Neto returned to their usual state of mutual antagonism.

In March, 1977, and again in May, 1978, the Katanganese broke loose from Angola. The setting of the two invasions was the same: the copper-rich Shaba (ex-Katanga) Province that provides more than three-fourths of Zaire's foreign exchange. The actors were much the same: a ragtag lot of Katanganese, reinforced by a few hundred more recent Zairian recruits, nearly all from the Lunda tribe. The plot was the same: to seize Shaba in order to overthrow the Mobutu regime, already staggering under some \$3-billion worth of foreign debts and widespread domestic grumblings because of severe economic hardships. The outside connection was the same: Angola provided some logistical support and allowed the invaders to march, armed with Soviet equipment and trained (insofar as they were trained at all) by Cuban advisers. And the heroes were the same: French and Moroccan troops sweeping in from the north to drive the aggressors back south.

Mobutu played both invasions—dubbed Shaba I and Shaba II—for all they were worth. *Le Guide*, as

he likes to be called, highlighted the East-West dimensions of the invasion rather than the more local but real causes. In his typically flamboyant manner, he said in the midst of Shaba II, "There is the total surrender of the West before the aggression of the Russians and the Cubans. They can do anything at all in Africa. In the West, there are only pious wishes." He soon thereafter swept into Paris, wearing immaculately pressed Army fatigues and explaining how he had just left "the front" to meet with more than 20 African heads of state and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to discuss African security issues.

The ploy worked miracles. Giscard sped to Washington and convinced President Jimmy Carter to act more boldly than he had during Shaba I. In May and June, 1978, the White House dispatched 18 Air Force C-141 transports to assist the French-Belgian airlift of men and equipment and later to ferry many of the 600 Senegalese, 150 Togogalese and 50 Gabonese who, along with the 1,500 front-line Moroccan troops, constituted a so-called "Pan-African Force." The episode was typical of Mobutu's deftness in internationalizing domestic woes. Miraculously, his regime has also mustered help from such varied quarters as China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and North Korea.

The master's ploys again worked brilliantly, with the Katangese again retreating to Angola and rejoining the scores of anti-Mobutu groups in exile (mostly in Europe). They must all have come to realize that no incursion, even into Shaba, could oust Mobutu. No organized opposition has emerged in Kinshasa, where a successful overthrow must take place. After the rebels were chased from Kolwesi, in fact, Mobutu jetted around Africa and Europe, a sign of real confidence. When the previous President of Nigeria left for a moment, in far less perilous times, he was summarily ousted by those at home.

Angolan leaders, too, realized that Mobutu was there to stay for a while. For his part, Mobutu awoke to the fact that these spring forays, despite their inevitable drama and invariable thrusting of his name onto the world's headlines, must end. Neither state could afford continuing conflicts. The United States, after helping to assure Zaire's territorial integrity, strongly urged that old hatchets be buried. Top United States diplomats flew to Luanda to confer with President Neto in June, after reports indicated that in May other United States officials were sounding out Congress to assist anti-Neto forces.

The ground was thus laid for a diplomatic breakthrough, because both Zairian and Angolan leaders were willing to abandon their support for groups each out to subvert the other. In June, 1978, when Mobutu and Neto met on the neutral ground of Brazzaville, they agreed to the reopening of the Benguela Railroad, closed since the Angola civil war in 1975, the

repatriation of refugees living in one another's territory, and cessation of support to each other's opposition groups. Full diplomatic relations came in late July, a few weeks before Neto went to Kinshasa where Mobutu offered amnesty to the Katangans in Angola (among the estimated 200,000 Zairian refugees there). Both sides also agreed to an Organization of African Unity (OAU) "Control Commission" to help assure security "on their common border." Mobutu reciprocated with a state visit to Luanda in mid-October, 1978, where progress was reported on all these issues. Neto then boasted of how he had forced the Katanganese to move more than 60 miles from Zaire's border, mostly into refugee camps, and had disarmed them.

The United States moved in to sweeten the deal. Americans began to work more closely with Angolan officials, particularly on the Namibian question, where Neto apparently proved most helpful in gaining SWAPO's (the South-West African People's Organization) limited cooperation. Zaire, for her part, received some \$26 million in previously withheld United States food aid and security assistance, for her new stance of friendship towards Angola and for taking some measures to help her battered economy and to foster human rights.

The new but still tenuous amity between Kinshasa and Luanda helped strengthen their relations with Zambia. Previously, Mobutu had been deeply offended that Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda offered no public support—if not for personal ties or neighborly kindness, then at least for the principle of African territorial integrity—during the two invasions. Mobutu was further incensed when Kaunda made his first trip to Luanda during Shaba I. Neto, for his part, resented Kaunda's open support for UNITA during (and perhaps since) the civil war. To complete the acrimonious triangle, Kaunda was down on Mobutu for his continued use of trade routes through Zambia for deals with the white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa and was angry at Neto for not doing more to force the reopening of the Benguela Railroad, by means of which Zambia had previously exported the bulk of her precious copper.

These wounds, too, have partially healed. Mobutu no longer appears so evil in trading with the white devils, now that Kaunda has reopened his own rail link through Rhodesia, to ship copper and to receive fertilizer via South African ports. Neto, at long last, seems intent on reopening the railroad, if Cuban troops can protect the vast stretch of lines running through UNITA-controlled territory. Neto and Kaunda have also dealt more fully with each other as fellow members of the "Front-Line States," mandated by the OAU to help push black rule in Rhodesia and Namibia.

So the tempers of the rulers in Central Africa have

mellowed considerably over the past year. Most important, each leader has found the more relaxed atmosphere a necessity, because severe economic problems have arisen to overshadow these regional concerns.

President Mobutu Sese Seko is eminently suited to consolidate a fractionated, highly volatile political entity and begin molding it into a nation-state. He seems, however, just as eminently unsuited to address the economic and social needs of the people, once political consolidation has begun.

Zaire, for all her lauded natural mineral riches, remains a dismally impoverished nation, a "land of plenty," according to one correspondent, "transformed into a nation of beggars, paupers, and thieves."<sup>1</sup> Purchasing power for the average Zairian has been sliced in half over the past five years, with both inflation and unemployment now topping the 50 percent mark. Zaire's gross national product (GNP) is in a steady decline, by some five to seven percent annually; the local currency is virtually worthless outside her borders and the nation faces a staggering \$3 billion in foreign debts.

Such stark statistics, of course, deeply affect the daily lives of Zaire's citizens. According to one study, real wages in Zaire have now fallen below the 1910 level. The transportation network is virtually defunct, with miles of usable roads now estimated at only one-seventh those that were available at independence in 1960. The production of agricultural commodities is now below the independence level, with food imports (then negligible) now exceeding some \$300 million.<sup>2</sup>

The causes of what Mobutu has called "le mal zairois" (the Zairian sickness) are many. One primary factor was the fall in the world price of copper—which accounts for over two-thirds of Zaire's foreign exchange—from a high of \$1.40 per pound in April, 1974, to a low of \$.55 per pound in December, 1975 (now hovering around \$.70). This decline meant that Zaire's total copper revenues for 1975 were less than half those for 1973. Meanwhile, of course, the price of Zaire's imports, particularly oil, have soared.

Much of the blame must be laid at Mobutu's feet. His government at times ignored the darkening economic clouds and at other times took flashy measures that hastened the storm's onset. In November, 1973, Mobutu "Zairianized" all foreign-owned agriculture, transportation, and commercial enterprises, and in late 1974 he compounded this error by "radicalizing" the economy, i.e., nationalizing all enterprises exceeding \$2 million in annual turnover. Most plantations and businesses were subsequently handed over to party loyalists in the Zairian elite, who managed them

poorly and sold most existing stock without reordering. The government's own treasury was handled much the same way; scarce foreign exchange was doled out for large prestige projects and ostentatious luxury items.

The two Shaba invasions contributed to the wreck, particularly Shaba II with its highly publicized white massacres and the subsequent white flight. Although damage to the copper mines and cobalt pits themselves was minimal, still 1978 production is projected to be some 50-80 percent below capacity, because of the lack of skilled managers and mine operators after the whites fled.

After Shaba II, Western states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to assist Zaire, if the government in turn would implement far-reaching economic and political reforms. Such cooperation seems to be proceeding, but as the old adage goes: while the grass grows, the horse starves. Economic decline can take place with breathtaking speed; economic reconstruction takes place with painful languor.

Zaire's people suffer, though they do not always suffer in silence. Deep feelings of discontent rose to the surface in an unusual but important statement issued by Zaire's 47 Catholic bishops in October, 1978. Most of these bishops are Zairian (only a handful are Belgians) and are influential since the Church still runs nearly all schools in the country, where over half profess Catholicism. The October statement deplored the "continuous worsening" of Zaire's problems, which include "irresponsibility and unscrupulousness, corruption, injustice in all its forms and appearance, public immorality, lack of foodstuffs and pharmaceutical products, juvenile delinquency, increase in violent crimes," among others. The bishops "weep with those who weep" over the "deterioration and distress, which to some is already apt to lead our country into the apocalypse." The blame is squarely laid on "the institutions of our country" which "are no longer capable of effectively living up to their primary task." The "honesty, integrity, and truthfulness" of public officials have "been controversial," in the bishops' classic understatement, while the entire system leads to a "dulling of conscience and the subjugation of the human personality" and to misery: "The man of Zaire has lost his respect for life."

The bishops dared not advocate a change of leadership, only of the leadership's direction: "May everybody muster his courage so that a change may be brought about in our country in order to bring real happiness to the people." Still the words are harsh, carrying additional impact because they were endorsed by the entire General Assembly of the Bishops of Zaire, whom Mobutu had, years ago, attempted to cow into submission. Apparently he failed.

Violent eruptions also indicate the boiling cauldron

<sup>1</sup>David Lamb "Corruption, Poverty Belie Zaire's Slogans," *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1978.

<sup>2</sup>Crawford Young "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall, 1978, pp. 169-187.

just below the surface of Zairian life. In February, 1978, a rural uprising in Bandundu—in the middle of the country—was put down only by harsh military reprisals. Apparently, 13 men were subsequently executed by a firing squad for their involvement—the first executions following a public trial for over a decade in Zaire. "I solemnly declare," the President then said, "that from now on I will be without pity against all attempts of that kind. Whoever tries to use the sword will perish by the sword." He was not known for his pity even before the trouble began.

Nonetheless, Mobutu has retained his politico-military adeptness at preserving if not augmenting his power. The most significant event during Shaba I and II is what did not occur. No organized resistance movement struck when the fire was hot. This was less a matter of sheer luck than sheer adroitness. The master politician Mobutu juggles government and military leaders to prevent any threatening local or command base opposition. His regional commissioners—equivalent to state governors—are assigned outside their tribal areas, usually cannot speak the local dialect, and are thus unable to build up any personal base of support. One military officer is frequently played off against another; the normally rigid command structure is blurred. This, too, prevents a concentration of power in hands other than Mobutu's.

While serving Le Guide's personal prowess, such neatly designed disorganization has weakened Zaire's political system and her armed forces. Top political leaders are so busy conniving, so distrustful of one another, and so fearful of making a decision offensive to the President that little energy remains for effective implementation of government programs.

Outside powers, particularly the Belgians, with many ties from colonial days, throw up their hands in disgust. But little excessive love is lost on the other side either. Mobutu frequently lashes out at the Belgians, even to the point of breaking diplomatic relations. Nor is the United States ignored. Zaire's Foreign Minister Umba di Lutete said recently in Washington, D.C., that the best way "to be friends with the United States is to stand up to it, to accuse it of imperialism rather than to support it."<sup>13</sup> His government should know. Zaire has expelled two United States ambassadors, has denounced a presidential appointment for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and has generally criticized the United States when the fancy struck. Nonetheless, Zaire's relations with the outside world may improve now that some accommodation is under way with Angola and some economic direction is being imposed by the IMF. Maybe, just maybe, Zaire has now

reached her vortex and has begun a slow yet steady climb toward realizing her enormous potential.

### EMBATTLED ZAMBIA

The new peace between her Angolan and Zairian neighbors offered a ray of sunshine for Zambia, otherwise beset by woes galore. 1978 was not a good year for Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who watched in horror as his neighbor Rhodesia slid precipitously into chaos, trying to tug Zambia in her wake.

Domestically, Kaunda is fair minded. There are relatively few political prisoners in Zambian jails. The press, while entirely government-owned, criticizes some official policies. The judiciary is independent on most issues. And the Parliament, though dominated by members of the ruling party, may alter the President's policies in slight ways.

While remaining popular, Kaunda faced the harshest criticism ever in 1978, because of the nation's severe economic plight and the President's preoccupation with southern African politics. The two factors are intertwined: Kaunda's abhorrence of white-minority rule led to vastly reduced trade with South Africa and a total economic boycott of Rhodesia. Previously, South Africa supplied over half Zambia's imports; closing the Rhodesian border inflicted even greater hardships (the United Nations estimated that the 1973 move cost Zambia more than \$1 billion).

As the turmoil of southern Africa intensified, the world price of copper declined. This struck the very heart of the Zambian economy, because copper production accounts for more than 90 percent of Zambia's export earnings and a full third of her gross domestic product. Copper is the nation's lifeblood; Kaunda said his country "was born with a copper spoon in its mouth." Copper prices over recent years hit rock bottom. In 1974, for example, Zambia's copper revenues totaled some \$1.3 billion while in 1977, copper revenues slipped to \$875 million. Transportation compounds the problem, because it is difficult to ship copper from the landlocked nation. Previously, the Benguela Railroad hauled over 60 percent of Zambia's minerals. The Chinese-built Tan-Zam Railroad (now called Tazara) has undergone a host of structural and operational problems since opening in 1976; its end point, Dar es Salaam, has been highly congested, which adds to the problem.

In October, 1978, Kaunda took the personally  
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**Kenneth L. Adelman** served in the Department of State (AID) in 1975-1976 and as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in 1976-1977. He has traveled extensively in Zaire and Angola and is a contributor to *Africa Report*, *Africa Today*, *Journal of African Studies* and *Foreign Affairs*.

<sup>13</sup>Speech by the State Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 9, 1978.

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"... as new generations of leaders come to power, it may well move the power balance in directions unfavorable to United States and Western interests in North Africa, in the Saharan region and in parts of sub-Saharan Africa."

## North Africa: Struggle for Primacy

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS  
*Adjunct Professor, Sino-Soviet Institute, George Washington University*

THE political leadership of North Africa is about to embark on a new season of political crisis. At the heart of the looming crisis is the anticipated passing of first generation post-independence leadership and the end of an era—one characterized by the emergence of a new generation of North Africans—finely educated and well grounded in the fundamentals of international politics. President Houari Boummediene, who presided over Algeria's affairs since the military coup of June, 1965, toppled Ahmed Ben Bella from power, died in December, 1978, after a serious illness. And the stewardship of President Habib Bourguiba, who has ruled Tunisia since she achieved independence on March 20, 1976, may soon end.

Several important events attracted even more attention than usual to North Africa. In January, 1978, a series of trade union leaders allegedly sparked wide-ranging riots in Tunisia, which directly challenged the authority of the Bourguiba regime and led to hundreds of arrests and millions in property damage. In due course, 101 trade unionists, members of the General Union of Trade Unions (UGTT), were placed on trial. By the end of 1978, many, including their former chieftain, Secretary General Habib Achour, had been convicted and sentenced. However, the problems that had provoked the riots remain, and could unleash similar expressions of frustration and alienation in the future.

The roots of Tunisia's difficulties are to be found in the failure of her existing leadership to chart a well-defined course for the months and years ahead. Beset by uncertainty, anxious to avoid the anger of aging President Bourguiba who has been incapacitated by infirmity or the disfavor of his family, and clearly unable to reinfuse life into the national party—the Destourian-Socialists—the leadership is simply not leading. It is immobilized at a time when the Tunisian economy is faltering, when national productivity is stagnant, and when the number of foreign aid donors is diminishing.

Pressures for economic and political change are building in Tunisia, precisely because for more than a

decade the government has gambled with the imperfections of a "command economy."<sup>1</sup> A "command economy" is one in which the government has direct or centralized control over all productive sectors. It engages in planning and in the management of these sectors, seeks to control prices, and funnels profits into priority development sectors. Unfortunately, the Tunisian experiment has been found wanting and the architect of the program (Ahmed Ben Salah) has been disgraced and forced into exile.

Over the past four years, the Tunisian economy has lost its former dynamism. Agriculture, the principal source of employment, has declined in productivity and now accounts for less than 18 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Tunisia's balance of trade position is also weak, registering a serious deficit in 1976 and 1977—over \$700 million in both years. Even tourism, one of the major traditional profit industries, has registered only marginal gains. These factors, together with serious inflation, an increasingly under-employed student population, the lack of effective government direction, and doubts concerning the capabilities of the present political leadership, all serve to raise serious concern about Tunisian stability in the post-Bourguiba period.

The potential for turmoil is ever present. The real tragedy, should instability materialize, will be the threat to political moderation in North Africa. Symbolically at least, the government of President Bourguiba has long been regarded in the United States as a model for such moderation. The high level of United States economic assistance to Tunisia—on a per capita basis, among the highest over the past two decades—has been material testimony to our endorsement of the policy course chosen by Bourguiba. The collapse of his regime could well reflect the collapse of our own hopes for political stability in the region.

The second major event to attract international attention to North Africa was the extended visit of Algeria's President Boummediene to Moscow during the fall of 1978 and his death shortly thereafter. Amid rumors of a pre-succession crisis, the President remained in Moscow for intensive medical treatment. He died in Algiers on December 26 after a long illness. Boummediene's successors confront a wide range of continuing difficulties. In the Western Saha-

<sup>1</sup>See Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977).

ra, the military faces Moroccan forces that are increasingly hard-pressed in their efforts to contain Polisario rebel bands. The threat of a direct conflict between Morocco and Algeria, as a result of Algeria's open support for the Polisario,\* has risen appreciably in recent months. In addition, the Algerian economy faces serious difficulties because of overambitious development projects, shortages of managerial personnel, balance of payments deficiencies, short-term liquidity problems and the ever-taxing spiral of inflation. While oil and natural gas exports remain substantial, agricultural productivity has declined, as has the output from small-scale transforming industries.

The net effect of Algeria's many economic shortfalls and failures has been the undermining of the revolutionary élan that characterized Algeria and her nationalist leadership at independence in mid-1962. In the more than 15 years since, the revolution has lost the zeal of the rank and file; most of its wartime chieftains have engaged in intramural quarrels and have been consigned to exile or to prison; the remaining leadership has turned to European-educated technicians and advisers to fashion and implement long-range development schemes. Unfortunately, they have also issued grave and contradictory rulings that have dissipated energies and compounded confusion. Today, the ruling party—the National Liberation Front (FLN)—has fallen on straitened circumstances and enjoys no mass membership or following; the country's labor organizations also lack effective direction.

#### LIBYA

In marked contrast, Libya's leadership maintains its dedication to the revolutionary path. Guided by the principles in the "Green Book," written and purveyed by its President, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, Libya is passing through a complete transformation in her political and economic life. During the initial stages of the revolution, all vestiges of the previous political system, the touchstones of the rule of King Idris who was deposed in September, 1969, have been systematically suppressed or eliminated. Thus, the old aristocracies of Tripoli and Benghasi, the liberal bourgeoisie, the middle class bureaucracies and the great tribal chieftains have all been jettisoned. In their place, Colonel Qaddafi and his cohorts have moved to create a new society guided and inspired by the precepts of traditional Islam and Qaddafi's vision of a purely Libyan form of egalitarian socialism.

Qaddafi has dedicated his regime to the total elimination of three capitalist vices—profit, private property and private wealth. Instead, he wants to substitute a utopian vision that is rooted in traditional

Islam and an Arab variant of Marxist socialism. What is being destroyed is clearer, however, than that which is to replace the old system.

Compulsory education, compulsory participation in the new political system, compulsory military training, and the accelerating introduction of women into the work force are all contributing to the eclipse of Libya's historic patterns of life. The jobs of tens of thousands of men that depended on the old system . . . have been eliminated and their holders sent off to more productive tasks, in a move as much symbolic as economic.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the nature of the goal, Colonel Qaddafi's directed revolution has led to transformations that will not be reversed and to the crushing of institutions and values that cannot be restored.

The Qaddafi "Green Book" stresses that all Libyans are entitled to have their basic and personal material needs met; it is incumbent on the state to provide food, housing, clothing and other essentials. The state, however, opposes multiple ownership of property (tribal), of means of production (factories and plants), and of group profits (corporations and commercial enterprises). The people will ultimately hold title to all group property, particularly the country's means of production. The process has already been launched with the nationalization or expropriation of most major foreign holdings in Libya.

The political effects of Qaddafi's unique form of socialism are equally explicit. All political parties have been outlawed and dismantled; participation in government is to come through popular (mass) conventions or congresses. The views of these congresses are to be communicated to local officials who, in turn, are expected to convey them to the central governing authority at Tripoli. The congresses are enjoined to formulate a consensus on all matters—including the effectiveness of regional governments, local social and educational goals, economic planning needs, and even the performance of local administrative staffs.

Thus far, this experiment in participatory democracy has produced no meaningful impact on the composition, policies or direction of the top Libyan ruling group. Colonel Qaddafi remains the supreme revolutionary authority. His fiat, ideological instructions and policy stances are not challenged (at least openly). Most of Libya's 2.5 million people welcome the changes that he has set in motion; they have prospered as a result of welfare programs that have been introduced; their children have benefited from the government attack on illiteracy; jobs are plentiful and incomes are adequate. Those who resent or bridle at Qaddafi's approach—essentially tribal elders, merchants, and the former landed aristocracy—have learned to accommodate themselves to the government's will and to await a future when Qaddafi will himself "awaken to the realities of Libya and contemporary international politics."

\*The rebel group fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara.

<sup>2</sup>See Thomas W. Lippman in *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1978, p. A25.

Libya's ideological and political chieftain is not likely to be soon persuaded to deviate from the domestic and foreign policy approaches he has fashioned. If anything, given Qaddafi's conviction that Libya must play a leadership role in the Arab and the third world, he is likely to insist on dedication to revolutionary goals. Thus he gives financial support to liberation groups worldwide (the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, the African National Congress), he offers public endorsement of the position of groups opposed to the Camp David accords, and he maintains a close policy alignment with like-minded governments in Cuba, Uganda and Angola.

Qaddafi's thinking on international issues is simplistic and often muddled. He believes that Libya must use her oil wealth freely to have an impact on Arab and African politics. He sees nothing quixotic or contradictory about fomenting rebellion in the Sudan, accepting the risks of military conflict with Egypt, or seeking to subvert African regimes, all in the name of unity and the need to establish base areas for worldwide revolution. Those that oppose these goals are regarded by Qaddafi as supporters of Zionist racism, American imperialism or European neocolonialism.

Nothing so clearly exemplifies the Libyan sense of mission than the role that Qaddafi has played in the Chad. Taking advantage of the traditional animosities that have characterized relations between the Arabized Saharan tribes of the Northern Chad and the black-dominated government at N'djamena, Qaddafi has used force to seize border territory long claimed by Libya while providing arms, financial support and sanctuary to Saharan insurgent groups. The principal insurgent force, FROLINAT has benefited greatly from Libyan largesse (and from Soviet arms) to seize control of fully one-half of Chad's territory. While French troops held the rebels at bay, the beleaguered government at N'djamena has recently negotiated a truce and is seeking to form a new coalition of "national reconciliation." Although Libya is a putative co-sponsor of this latest effort at mediation, it is clear that Qaddafi's terms involve the withdrawal of all French troops from Chad, a concession that would be a risky gamble for Chad at best.

#### MOROCCO'S CRISIS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA

The third event of international significance was Moroccan King Hassan's brief visit to Washington in mid-November, 1978. The King's sojourn had been postponed the previous year because of his outrage over the United States disinclination to sell Morocco military equipment for use against Polisario rebels in the Western Sahara. He believed the official United States position to be unreasonable in the face of his favorable posture on Arab-Israeli questions, his public condemnation of the Cuban military presence in

Angola and Ethiopia, and his willingness to send Moroccan forces to shore up the position of the tottering Joseph Mobutu regime in Zaire in the midst of the first Shaba invasion by ex-Katanga rebels in March-April, 1977.

The roots of the Western (Spanish) Sahara crisis extend to the 1960's when Morocco, claiming historic rights of eminent domain, sought to reclaim the Western Sahara region and opposed the granting of independence to Mauritania by France. The use of military force in this area produced a brief and inconclusive border war with Algeria in the early 1960's. Algerian-Moroccan disagreements ultimately came to focus on Spanish Sahara, where Morocco claimed her right of annexation upon the departure of Spanish control, while Algeria endorsed the principle of self-determination for the territory's 60,000-70,000 inhabitants. In the interest of compromise, President Boumedienne declared that Algeria would accept the partition of the area between Morocco and Mauritania if the Saharaoui population agreed. There was enough ambiguity in the Algerian position to lead Hassan to conclude that he had a free hand with respect to the region.

In the interim, in September, 1974, Morocco approached the International Court of Justice for an opinion as to her historic right of sovereignty over the Spanish Sahara. By July, 1975, Boumedienne had apparently reversed himself and entered a petition before the court, arguing in favor of the principle of self-determination. The Hague opinion resolved little. The court ruled that a foundation existed for claiming pre-colonial ties of "allegiance" but not of "sovereignty" on the part of the territory's population. The court recommended the adoption of the principle of self-determination as the appropriate next step.

However, the dramatic, attention-riveting "Green March" of October, 1975, in which thousands of unarmed Moroccan civilians crossed into Spanish Sahara to claim their historic rights, led Spain to capitulate, withdraw her army, and accept the partition of her erstwhile territory by Morocco and Mauritania. King Hassan had won round one.

While Morocco and Mauritania sought to consolidate their positions, the opposing Polisario organization decided on a dramatic stratagem of its own. Virtually the entire Saharaoui population was evacuated to southwestern Algeria. Polisario then proceeded to organize a consultation of the population, which expressed general support for creation of a separate state. With the support of Algeria, an

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William H. Lewis has served for a number of years as a senior State Department officer and specialist on North African affairs. He has published several books and a number of articles on problems in the Maghreb.

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*"A military decision to permit a return to civilian rule is taken only in exceptional circumstances: when the military suffers division in its ranks; when there is a poor or faltering economic performance; when there are strong and well-organized civilian sectors capable of sustained resistance to military rule; and when such resistance and military repression lead to further cleavages within a professional military."*

## From Military to Civilian Regimes in Ghana and Nigeria

BY JON KRAUS

*Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Fredonia*

**I**N late 1978, more than half the independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa were ruled by their military officer corps, which have come to rival their Latin American and Middle East counterparts. Once in power, most military rulers have shown little inclination to return rule to civilian hands when the most important causes of their coups d'état have been dealt with. Of the 19 sub-Saharan states that currently have military regimes, only 4 have seen a military government return power to civilian rulers (Upper Volta, Ghana, Dahomey/Benin, and Sudan), and in the Sudan, in 1964, civilian political forces had to wrest power from the military by force. A military regime has been turned out in only one other African country, Sierra Leone.

However, in late 1978, 5 of the 19 military regimes were planning a return to civilian rule, most of them in 1979. These countries included Ghana, Upper Volta (both for the second time), Nigeria, Rwanda and Mali. Of these countries, Ghana and Nigeria are the more important countries, and are most likely to sustain civilian, democratic governments. This is significant in a continent where there are currently only two countries (tiny Gambia and Botswana) with working democracies, although several others permit some electoral choice within single-party systems (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania) or are again permitting opposition parties. Nigeria also occupies a role of singular importance in Africa as the most populous state and one whose oil has until recently stimulated fairly rapid development. Nigeria's size and resources give her more potential for development than most African states. In recent years she has started to assert herself in inter-African politics and has acquired substantial influence and attracted a great deal of attention from major powers, including the United States. In both Nigeria and Ghana, the route back to civilian rule is virtually irreversible, since the ban on party politics has been lifted and parties have been formed that are actively seeking the support of the electorate.

A military decision to permit a return to civilian

rule is taken only in exceptional circumstances: when the military suffers division in its ranks; when there is a poor or faltering economic performance, when there are strong and well-organized civilian sectors capable of sustained resistance to military rule; and when such resistance and military repression lead to further cleavages within a professional military.

Before examining the factors that led back to civilian rule in Ghana and Nigeria, it is useful to note briefly the background of the current military governments. Ghana, unlike Nigeria, has had two separate and distinct periods of military government. The first military regime was the military-police National Liberation Council (NLC) government, which in 1966 overthrew the state socialist, corrupt and authoritarian single-party system of Kwame Nkrumah, whose nationalist Convention People's party (CPP) had led Ghana to independence in 1957. Reacting against the abuses and economic policies of the last years of the Nkrumah regime, the military NLC government espoused liberal economic and political ideas. It promised a rapid return to civilian rule under a democratic constitution and a system that would deter abusive government. It pursued an economic strategy of retrenchment in state spending and state corporate activity, renewed ties to Western countries, sought (unsuccessfully) foreign private capital and a reduction and rescheduling of the foreign indebtedness it had inherited, and promoted indigenous private capital.

Democratic government was restored in 1969, when Kofi Busia's Progress party (PP) was voted into power. Busia's government continued the NLC's liberal economic policies, but with a greater emphasis on economic growth. However, its strategy (like that of the Nkrumah government) foundered, in part because of recurring economic crises, aggravated by sharp fluctuations of the world price of cocoa, which provides some 65-70 percent of Ghana's foreign exchange earnings. An austerity budget in 1971 brought discontent with the Busia regime to a head among cocoa

farmers, trade unionists, students, and the civil service and military, whose perquisites were reduced by budgetary stringencies and a sharp devaluation of 45 percent in December, 1971.

In January, 1972, the military seized power under Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong, who established the National Redemption Council (NRC) government (renamed the Supreme Military Council, or SMC, in 1975). It rejected the liberal "open economy" strategy of the Busia government, quickly repudiated a substantial portion of "tainted" debts owed to Western powers, and proclaimed a policy of economic "self-reliance" and economic nationalism. Unlike the NLC, Acheampong gave only the vaguest indication that civilian rule would return. He declined to name a date until compelled to do so by the protests and strikes of lawyers, other professionals, and students in June-July, 1977. Acheampong and his closest military collaborators were removed from power by other senior military leaders in July, 1978.

#### **NIGERIA'S MILITARY**

Nigeria has experienced continuous military rule since 1966. She became independent in 1960 as a federation, composed of three regions, in each of which the ethnically dominant group<sup>1</sup> controlled power through a party. The predominantly Muslim Northern Region was the largest, most populous and the most traditional, ruled by Fulani emirates and the conservative Northern People's Congress (NPC). The NPC controlled the federal government in a coalition with the party from the Ibo-dominated Eastern region. Politics declined progressively into corruption, political warfare, and bitter struggles for power and wealth among the three major parties. The NPC sought to expand from its northern regional base and the two southern parties attempted to protect their regional power and privilege. The conflicts were all the more bitter and dangerous because of the close linkage between ethnic identity and political parties, at a time when substantial minority ethnic groups in each region chafed under the rule of the dominant group.

In January, 1966, a group of young, predominantly Ibo officers launched a murderous coup d'état which led to the death of the federal Prime Minister and two regional prime ministers. Although the coup did not succeed, civilians handed authority over to the senior

<sup>1</sup>Nigeria has some 250 ethnic/tribal groups, but the largest and politically most important are the Yoruba (about 13 million) in the west, the Ibo (7.8 million) in the east, and the Fulani (5 million plus) and Hausa (6.8 million) in the north. Other important groups include the Edo (900,000) in the west; Ibibio (about 1 million) and Ijaw (900,000) in the eastern states, and the Kanuri (2.9 million), Nupe (500,000) and Tiv (1.5 million) in the northern states. These are rough figures, since no recent census has been accepted as valid.

officer, General Aguiyi-Ironsi (also an Ibo, hence suspect in the north). When he tried to abolish the regions, northern troops mutinied, Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed, and northern officers chose Colonel Yakubu Gowon (a northerner, but neither Hausa nor Fulani) as head of state. In the north and elsewhere there was wide-scale, anti-Ibo rioting and killing, and Ibo people fled back to the Eastern region. Although Gowon announced a program for a return to civilian rule after specific problems had been solved, Eastern region resistance to federal government rule led to civil war between federal Nigeria and the east (Biafra) from May, 1967, to January, 1970. In October, 1970, Gowon announced a new program for a return to civilian rule in October, 1976, after the following problems were resolved: demobilization of the now 250,000-man federal army; settlement of the question of more states (they had been expanded from 4 to 12 in May, 1967, to prevent the dominance of any one state and to give local power to ethnic minorities); a new census (the 1963 census had been widely disputed, since population was the basis for the allocation of federal seats and revenue); a new revenue allocation plan and implementation of a national development plan; eradication of corruption; and the creation of a new constitution, genuinely "national" parties and the holding of elections.

In the 1970-1974 period, Gowon maneuvered narrowly between the pressures from army commanders and the army itself (the former wanting, the latter fearing, demobilization), his state military governors, popular demands for more states, and the flaring of old political and ethnic suspicions when the census results of 1973 were rejected as inaccurate. Public corruption, especially among the state military governors, grew flagrant and was covered up by Gowon. Civil servant and worker demands for increased wages to offset inflation demonstrated government incompetence. The administration granted a massively inflationary wage settlement in 1974 and then vacillated in the face of wide-scale strikes in both the private and public sectors. Gowon proved increasingly incapable of making the necessary decisions, and in October, 1974, he seized on the renewed political dissension on the 1973 census to postpone the return to civilian rule indefinitely. This decision provoked antagonism among increasingly skeptical civilians and military leaders. Junior military officers removed Gowon from office in July, 1975, and selected General Murtala Mohammed, a northerner of aristocratic family, to become head of state. Mohammed moved quickly and decisively to deal with the outstanding problems Gowon had neglected and announced a schedule for a return to civilian rule in October, 1979, one to which the military leaders have kept.

In Nigeria, the two coups in 1966 and the civil war increased the size of the military from 8,500 in 1966 to

250,000 and changed the composition of Nigeria's officer corps. Once led for the most part by southern officers, the officer corps was no longer made up of Ibos but was led largely by officers from the north and the Middle Belt (the southern areas of northern Nigeria, not Hausa-Fulani). Gowon was a compromise leader, and he worked hard to restore the unity of an officer corps and army torn apart by ethnic fears and by coups in which officers killed other officers. However, neither his position nor his personality were sufficiently strong to control other officers during the civil war or to command the obedience of military governors after the 12 states were created in 1967.

Distinct constituencies developed within the army, based on conflicts among Yoruba, Hausa and Middle Belt peoples, specialists versus combat units, and military versus civilian officers (e.g., military state governors). Promotional disparities (with rapid wartime promotions putting previous junior officers in competition with senior officers for posts) contributed to the tension. Many officers from "majority" groups (the largest ethnic groups) were inclined toward a return to civilian rule, influenced by the fact that their people could expect to prosper with political power (a notion supported by Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa civilian politicians as well). In contrast, many "minority" group officers had benefited by rapid promotion in the military and were among Gowon's closest collaborators. A relatively small number of officers served in civilian positions; among these the state governors, who were fairly independent, were in many areas not eager to return to civilian rule. Gowon's refusal to rotate officers among these positions also alienated many officers, and the increasingly flagrant corruption of state governors led many officers to want to return to civilian rule in order to protect the military's reputation and position. There were similar divisions with respect to issues like the scope and nature of demobilization (which groups would lose or gain), the role that the army should play (participating in socioeconomic programs or maintaining traditional roles), and budgetary allocations.<sup>2</sup> In addition, these different views were increasingly articulated publicly by army officers. This lack of unity made conflict in the military more volatile; it also increased the probability of civilian rule.

The Federal Military Government (FMG) was composed of a Supreme Military Council (SMC), made up exclusively of military leaders, and a Federal Executive Council, the Cabinet of commissioners of government ministries, including civilians and officers. At the state level, each military governor was advised by a Cabinet of commissioners. At both levels,

<sup>2</sup>On the military, see Ian Campbell, "Army Reorganization and Military Withdrawal," K. Panter-Breck, ed., *Soldiers and Oil* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 58-99.

the governments were supported by both the military and civilians, the latter drawn from the ranks of former leading politicians, senior civil servants, and other civilian professionals and businessmen. In a political economy flush with new oil riches, huge government contracts, and policies promoting indigenous capital, senior civil servants, politicians old and new, and military officers collaborated to their mutual benefit in power and wealth.

While the FMG performed indecisively and poorly under Gowon, it acted with enormous dispatch under Murtala Mohammed, providing Nigerians with their first truly popular national leader. Within several months, Mohammed postponed the mismanaged Black Festival of Arts and set up a review of the lagging National Development Plan (oil revenues had dropped off); removed all state governors, virtually all of whom were investigated and dismissed with ignominy from the military; compelled all service chiefs, officers above brigadier rank, and federal commissioners to retire; started a purge of government workers to remove the corrupt and inefficient in "Operation Dead Wood," a purge that spread to state corporations and universities and ended in the firing of 10,000 employees; established a series of commissions to investigate crucial problems (the question of more states, a new federal capital), whose reports were acted on quickly; and established a schedule for constitution-making and elections that would return civilian rule in October, 1979.

Military rule became collegial yet decisive. General Mohammed's rapid and direct approach was working, although this approach was less successful in clearing Lagos's congested port and its clogged streets. It did not work with army demobilization, which was left to the army commanders, who announced a decision to reduce the army to 100,000 men (80-90 percent of the bloated military budget was consumed by salaries). In February, 1976, Mohammed was assassinated in an attempted military coup that was inspired by junior officer nervousness at the promotions tests and the demobilization. The attempt involved at least two plots; more than 20 officers were executed, including the Army Chief of Staff. Under Mohammed's successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo, demobilization ground to a halt.

#### GHANA'S MILITARY

The Acheampong military government in Ghana did not suffer from the same type of military disunity as Nigeria; until 1978, it was able to cope with most of its problems outside the public gaze.

The Acheampong coup in 1972 was led by a colonel and three majors, who dominated the National Redemption Council (NRC). Thus junior officers were giving orders to senior officers. In part, this was solved by bringing into the NRC a coalition of middle-rank

and senior officers who had been treated poorly by past regimes in terms of promotions, postings, or forced retirement. The exclusion of the chiefs of the military services from the NRC created conflicts. In October, 1975, they forced Acheampong to restore a military hierarchy and create a new Supreme Military Council (SMC), comprising only the senior military officers and the police head. Some Ewe in the military believed themselves to be victims of ethnic discrimination. Several of the coup plots (about one a year) and the trials involved low-ranking Ewes.

Acheampong was able to maintain relative unity in the military and secure its support for his regime in a number of ways. In contrast to Nigeria, where a very small proportion of officers served in civilian posts, the Acheampong government from the beginning appointed military officers to the top positions in all major government ministries, regional administrations, state corporations and public boards. Thus, the officer corps had a substantial power stake in the government. The government sought to legitimate this role by articulating a governing mission for the military. When the government subsequently faltered in 1975, Acheampong established the SMC, which made the military more responsible. Neither the 1972 coup nor the 1975 regime change led to significant increases in military expenditures; military energies were devoted to running the country. The military budget (which had been reduced in 1970 and 1971) continued to decline in 1972-1973. Despite some increases, in constant dollar terms it remained significantly below the reduced military budgets of 1970-1971 (and about half that of 1967-1968). The Acheampong government had initially prevented military grievances by denying promotions to coup leaders, and when promotions were given in 1975, officers were not jumped out of line. The regime also offered officers certain material perquisites; those serving in civilian posts received supplemental pay or allowances. In addition, it became increasingly apparent that some officers were allowed to engage in flagrantly corrupt activities without being brought to task; these activities involved misappropriations, government contract kick-back demands, import and sales tax avoidance, smuggling, and import license deals.

The façade of military unity in Ghana, intermittently cracked by an unexplained "retirement" of a chief of defense staff, or a sudden resignation, was finally shattered by the repression unleashed by Acheampong against his civilian political opponents in 1977-1978.

#### **NIGERIA'S ECONOMY**

Oil wealth has changed the national accounts of Nigeria, but it is unclear how much this affluence has changed the nature or extent of her underdevelopment. Pre-oil Nigeria was one of Africa's

poorest countries in per capita terms, and per capita GNP (gross national product) growth from 1960 to 1965 was very low. Oil became a small component of Nigeria's exports in 1962, then grew to almost one-third of her exports by value in 1966, over 80 percent in 1972-1973, and 92 percent in 1974, with the four-fold increase in oil prices. Between 1966 and 1974, oil production increased by five times, and the value of oil exports, 30 times. By 1974-1975, over three-fourths of federal government revenues and over 80 percent of total government revenues were derived from oil. The moderate growth rates of the 1965-1970 period turned into high growth rates in the early 1970's. However, maximum production was reached in 1974, at 2.3 million barrels per day, and, in line with OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) strategies, was reduced in 1975 and again in 1976. Production varied between 1.5 m. b/d and 1.9 m. b/d during 1978, and foreign exchange earnings and government revenues also dropped drastically.

In 1974-1975, when the third national development plan was being drafted, it was estimated that Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves would rise annually by over ₦ 3 billion (1 Naira=\$1.56). No constraints on foreign exchange were foreseen. Consequently, both the governments (federal and state) and private citizens engaged in massive uncontrolled spending and importing. As a result, by 1976 Nigeria was running balance of trade deficits; instead of large hard currency reserves, she was forced to borrow \$1.75 billion from foreign banks in 1978. Public spending contracts involved commitments far beyond revenue capabilities. 1977 and 1978 were years of attempted austerity and economic contraction. It is possible that the new oil wealth of 1973-1974 contributed to Gowon's attempt to postpone civilian rule in 1974; growing economic problems will not induce Obasanjo to linger in office.

While oil production expanded, agricultural production, once the mainstay of the economy, stagnated or declined. This was true of every major crop except cotton. Major investments were made by the government in the mid-1970's, including investments in several large-scale irrigation schemes in the drought-stricken North. Obasanjo (copying Ghana) launched an "Operation Feed the Nation" program, with large government loans, most of which apparently went to large farmers, not to the peasant farmers who constitute the majority of the population.

These critical observations do not mean that a relatively wealthy Nigerian FMG was not trying to improve the lot of the common people: its development plan had a purportedly "common man" emphasis, with huge expenditures on education and health. The universal free primary education program launched in 1976 is a major undertaking; there was an increase in primary school enrollment from 4.8 mil-

lion students in 1975 to 8 million in 1976, and free education is being made available at other levels as well. It should be noted, nonetheless, that Nigeria spends more on the military than on education; Ghana, on the other hand, spent around three times as much on education as on the military in the mid-1970's.

The costs and benefits of Nigeria's affluence have been very unequally distributed. An inflation, which was low-key in the early 1970's, accelerated rapidly after 1974. The Lagos retail price index increased by 100 percent between 1974 and 1976, another 30 percent in 1977, and an estimated 40 percent during 1978. Only a small sector of the population was increasing its income enough to keep up with this level of inflation. A growing urban working class saw its 1974 wage increase rendered meaningless.

Oil has changed the face of Nigeria's economy. While once she opened her arms to foreign capital, Nigeria now controls the majority shares of all oil companies through the National Petroleum Corporation (having purchased 55 percent of the shares of the 16 operating companies). Through an indigenization program, Nigeria has confined a wide range of industries to Nigerian nationals and, in a 1976 policy directive, requires 100 percent, 60 percent, or 40 percent Nigerian participation (by either the state or by nationals) in various manufacturing, trading and service industries. The Nigerian state has overseen the creation of a newly endowed bourgeoisie. Through a Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board and following instructions to all commercial banks (now 60 percent Nigerian owned) to extend 40 percent of loans and advances to Nigerians, specific industries were sold to Nigerian businessmen. For those larger companies which have had to have only 40 percent-60 percent Nigerian ownership, public offerings of their shares have been sold and oversubscribed, thanks to loans extended to Nigerians eligible to obtain them (at least one-half the funds for purchasing of shares came from bank loans). The government is thus the creator of domestic capital and is an intermediary between domestic and foreign capital. Political linkages are crucial in the creation of a new class: senior civil servants are, at one and the same time, permanent secretaries in ministries, board members of local affiliates of multinationals, and investors in local stocks and industries with cooperative Nigerian businessmen.

Indigenization does not mean nationalization nor does it close the door to foreign capital. The Nigerian government is also staking out majority shares in joint ventures with foreign multinationals in a wide range of industrial ventures, including refineries, a long-aborning iron and steel industry, liquefied natural gas plants, a pulp and paper industry, and cement plants. Its most recent move to expand import-substitution

industrialization is the 1978 Import Prohibition Order which bans the import of more than 60 items that can be manufactured locally.

#### GHANA'S ECONOMY

If Nigeria's state and state-sponsored capitalism has problems and is quickly generating gross new inequalities, the SMC's management of the Ghanaian economy has been an unmitigated disaster. Initially, it did not appear to be unsuccessful and, unlike Nigeria's coups, Ghana's 1972 coup derived directly from the economic problems of 1971. The short-term problem was a balance of payments crisis, a sharp fall in living standards and huge debt repayments. The Acheampong government mounted a four-pronged program: economic nationalism including a partial debt repudiation, unilateral rescheduling of debts, and state majority control of all major mining, insurance, and banking firms, plus an indigenization program similar to but less comprehensive than Nigeria's; increased state control over economic activities, including the reimposition of import licensing, price controls and new restrictions on businesses (e.g., nonrepatriation of profits); efforts to increase productivity, most energetically in agriculture through "Operation Feed Yourself" and "Feed Your Industries" programs, in which government allocated budget money and loans to large-scale state and private farmers and to smaller peasant farmers, and sought successfully to mobilize popular support for farming; and maintaining living standards, through revaluation of the cedi, price and rent controls, increased social services, and rationalized food distribution. This contributed to recovery in the first three years (1972-1974); growth was nil in 1972 because of the lack of imports (60 percent of Ghanaian manufacturing inputs are imported) but increased in 1973 and 1974, as did agricultural production. The greatly increased world prices for Ghana's major exports—cocoa and gold—from 1972 on helped this trend.

However, a variety of factors created a condition of declining productivity and soaring inflation in 1974 and afterward. Some factors were outside the government's control: the quadrupling of oil prices in 1974 and its inflationary impact on all imports; several years of severe drought in northern Ghana; and a long-term decline in peasant food production, despite

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**Jon Kraus** has frequently undertaken research in West Africa. His most recent publications include "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Ukandi Dimachi and Lester Trachtman, eds., *Industrial Relations in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1978) and "Strikes and Labor Power in a Post-Colonial African State," *Development and Change* (April, 1979).

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### On Africa

THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION, VOL. II: EXILE POLITICS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE (1962-1976). *By John A. Marcum.* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978. 473 pages, appendix and index, \$25.00.)

The emergence of Angola from colony to civil war to independence (but not unity) is traced here in commanding detail. The author discusses key personalities and events and shows the connections between domestic and foreign developments. Although it is intended for specialists, the book is rich in detail and analysis and should prove of considerable interest to the lay reader.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

ETHIOPIA: EMPIRE IN REVOLUTION. *By Marina and David Ottaway.* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978. 250 pages, appendix and index, \$22.50, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

The Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa made the Ethiopian revolution and the Ethiopian-Somalian war significant at the international level. Two trained observers who lived in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1977 have written the most comprehensive and authoritative account of Ethiopia in the throes of revolutionary transformation. The book is rich in detail and discusses personalities, groups, and key events. It will be of particular interest to students of African politics and revolutionary behavior in third world countries. A.Z.R.

ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. *Compiled by Samir M. Zoghby.* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. 318 pages, glossary and index, \$8.50.)

This bibliography from the Library of Congress is a selection of books and periodical articles that offer research material on the role of Islam in Africa south of the Sahara. The guide contains 2,682 entries, divided by historical period. The glossary of Arabic terms and the detailed index of authors and subjects are especially valuable for the scholar.

O.E.S.

LET FREEDOM COME: AFRICA IN MODERN HISTORY. *By Basil Davidson.* (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1978. 431 pages, useful dates and index of names, \$12.50.)

Basil Davidson writes about the history of modern Africa south of the Sahara and of the development of nationalism during the 20th century. Davidson offers his interpretations of past history and his expectations for the future of the more than 46 countries south of the Sahara. O.E.S.

SOBHUZA II-NGWENYAMA AND THE KING OF SWAZILAND. *By Hilda Kuper.* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978. 363 pages, appendix, bibliography, photographs and index, \$30.00.)

This is the history of King Sobhuza and Swaziland, his small independent kingdom on the border of Mozambique and South Africa. Sobhuza II is the longest ruling monarch in Africa, a king "who built a modern nation within a political system . . . in which national interests were considered more important" than the desires of the King. The author believes that Sobhuza II will stand out "in modern history as a good king, a wise statesman, a gracious man." O.E.S.

AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE DIPLOMACY OF DEPENDENCY AND CHANGE. *By Ali A. Mazrui.* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. 310 pages and index, \$23.75, cloth; \$15.00, paper.)

Ali Mazrui describes Africa as a region "operating in a global context . . . whose people are now reaching out for a new definition of their place in the global scheme of things." His detailed descriptions of the relations of African nations with each other and with other nations of the world is interesting reading for the student of African history.

O.E.S.

IVORY COAST: THE CHALLENGE OF SUCCESS. *By Bastiaan A. den Tuinder.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 445 pages, statistical appendices and index, \$25.00, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

The Ivory Coast has had an "economic growth rate of over 7 percent during the past 25 years," a record unique on the African continent. Bastiaan den Tuinder analyzes the factors for this successful

growth in a very useful study loaded with statistical tables and detailed information garnered when the author was head of the World Bank's economic mission to the Ivory Coast in 1975. O.E.S.

MODERN NIGERIA. *By Guy Arnold.* (New York: Longman Inc., 1977. 192 pages, appendices and index, \$13.50, cloth; \$6.50, paper.)

Nigeria is the most populous country of Africa, with an estimated population in 1976 of about 778.7 million people. The country is rich in natural resources and is a large exporter of petroleum. Guy Arnold examines the history of modern Nigeria, including the changes in government since 1975, and evaluates Nigeria's future economic and political possibilities. O.E.S.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER. *By John Dugard.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. 470 pages, bibliography, table of cases, table of statutes and index, \$27.50, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

John Dugard has written an in-depth study of the legal system as it operates in South Africa today. He compares South African legal opinions and thought to contemporary thought and practice in other countries. He relates how the white South African perception of the legal order as a "legal system held in high esteem in all Western countries" (as Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons J.T. Kruger told the Parliament in 1977) differs from the perception of the black South Africans who "see in the law the white man's instrument of power and privilege." This is an excellent book for the legal scholar. O.E.S.

BRITAIN AND THE POLITICS OF RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE. *By Elaine Windrich.* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978. 283 pages and index, \$26.00.)

Elaine Windrich covers the period 1964-1977 in this study of how successive British governments have failed to solve the question of Rhodesian independence and the resulting conflicts. O.E.S.

ROOTS OF A REVOLUTION. *By Ndabaningi Sithole.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 142 pages, \$9.50.)

Ndabaningi Sithole is one of the founders of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and has fought for majority rule in Rhodesia for most of his life. He has written a thinly fictionalized account of the injustices suffered by all the black

people of Rhodesia and of the black militant movements that resulted.

EDUCATION AND POWER IN NIGERIA. *By Paul Beckett and James O'Connell.* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978. 224 pages and appendices, \$23.00.)

The authors write of the economic, political and social ideas that form the background of Nigerian politics. They believe that the educated bureaucratic elites have furnished a necessary government continuity through the structures they control and will continue to control.

AFRICAN PROCONSULS: EUROPEAN GOVERNORS IN AFRICA. *Edited by L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan.* (New York: The Free Press, 1978. 548 pages and index, \$29.95.)

This study "presents portraits of French, Belgian, Portuguese, German and British empire builders; it also attempts to evaluate colonialism in all its various stages. The authors describe 16 colonial executives before the decolonization of the sub-Saharan African countries. They believe that because of the "role of Western colonial enterprise in Africa, the composition, character, and effects of the colonial rule therefore raise some of the most significant questions that can be posed regarding modern Africa." O.E.S.

DECOLONIZATION: THE BRITISH, FRENCH, DUTCH AND BELGIAN EMPIRES, 1919-1963. *By Henri Grimal, translated by Stephan De Vos.* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. 443 pages, appendix, documents and index, \$23.75.)

Henri Grimal has written in great detail of the ways in which Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, willingly and unwillingly, lost their colonies. The section on African colonies is particularly interesting in contrast to experiences in other colonies on other continents. O.E.S.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AFRICAN POLITICS. *By Christian P. Potholm.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979. 307 pages, comprehensive bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

Christian Potholm writes about "the philosophical and theoretical wellsprings of contemporary politics" on the African continent. He traces historical antecedents and what he feels are relevant themes for the future. He handles detail in an interesting fashion and the extensive bibliography will be a mine of information for the student. O.E.S.

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## THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN ETHIOPIA

(Continued from page 114)

undermining Western influence and control on the continent; and preventing the growth of Chinese influence in Africa.<sup>20</sup> Cuba's policies may be described as: seeking to project the image of a nation morally and ideologically committed to national independence in the emerging world, thereby achieving status as a "leader" of the emerging nations; maintaining her interdependent relationship with the Soviet Union; and diminishing Western and particularly American influence in Africa.<sup>21</sup>

In pursuing these objectives, neither state can afford to forget that the African and Arab nations concerned with ongoing events in the area realize that the Soviet Union and Cuba are pursuing their own national interests in addition to the revolutionary objectives they allegedly espouse. Indeed, as Colin Legum has pointed out, no African state (aside from Ethiopia) has publicly accepted the Kremlin's justification of its realignment with Ethiopia as being derived from "revolutionary duty."<sup>22</sup> While African and Arab cynicism about Cuban activities in Africa has not yet reached the cynicism directed toward the Soviet Union, it is nonetheless growing. Rumors of Cuban involvement in the May, 1978, Shaba Affair accelerated this growth. Nonetheless, the Organization of African Unity's support of territorial integrity in Africa has added considerably to the legitimacy of the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopia.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, it must not be assumed that because Moscow and Havana are pursuing similar policies in Ethiopia, they have identical policy objectives. Indeed, both countries have ethnocentric considerations which derive from their own overall objectives in Africa. From the Soviet vantage point, the Kremlin sorely needs a policy success in the Red Sea

<sup>20</sup>For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Colin Legume, "The African Environment," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 27, no. 1 (January-February, 1978), pp. 1-2; and David E. Albright, "Soviet Polity," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 27, no. 1 (January-February, 1978), pp. 29-35.

<sup>21</sup>See Edward Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 26 (November-December, 1977), pp. 2-15; and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Cuba's African Adventure," *International Security*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Summer, 1977), pp. 3-10.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 6. See also T.A. Imobighe, "Danger in the Horn," *Afriscope*, vol. 7, no. 8 (August, 1977), p. 36.

<sup>23</sup>It should be pointed out that in the eyes of many Arab states, some of which support the Eritrean separatist cause and some of which fear growing Soviet influence on the Red Sea littoral, that involvement is both illegitimate and dangerous.

<sup>24</sup>"Ethiopia: Soviet Plans for Eritrea," *Africa Confidential*, vol. 19, no. 14 (July 7, 1978), pp. 3-6; and "Eritreans Urge Negotiations," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1978, p. 12.

littoral. Since 1973, Moscow's influence in the Red Sea area has dropped precipitously. The Kremlin has suffered setbacks in Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia. The only offsetting gain is Ethiopia, which would not be a Red Sea state if she lost Eritrea. Although the June 24 assassination of North Yemen's President Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi and the June 26 coup that overthrew South Yemen's President Salem Robaye Ali are both probably rightfully interpreted as favorable to Soviet interests in the area, it is too soon to make an objective assessment of either event.

As for the promotion of Soviet security interests, Moscow has also lost ground, most significantly when the Somalis asked the Soviet military to withdraw from their facilities at Berbera. The Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab are thus increasingly important, as are Djibouti and South Yemen. Assab's potential is underlined by the fact that much of the Cuban force currently in Ethiopia landed from Soviet ships there, and Massawa's importance is highlighted by the recent appearance of a Russian floating drydock at a nearby island. The drydock itself had been withdrawn earlier from Berbera. At the same time, while too much should not be read into it, the Soviet Union has made a pointed effort to establish diplomatic relations with independent Djibouti. As for South Yemen, the harbor at Aden could provide a useful Soviet base, but Yemeni leaders have indicated that any request for such a base would be denied.

Finally, Soviet efforts in the Horn of Africa have influenced some states in that area to seek closer relations with China. In 1978 both the Sudan and Somalia sent representatives to Peking in apparent efforts to obtain Chinese military assistance.

Given these considerations, Eritrea plays a significant role in Soviet policy toward Ethiopia in particular and toward the Horn of Africa in general. Thus in the summer of 1978 the Kremlin tried to open channels of communication with the Eritrean secessionists. In June, ELF head Ahmed Nasser spent 10 days in Moscow, and the Soviets again suggested that the Marxist states on the Red Sea littoral form a federation.<sup>24</sup> Fidel Castro had suggested this plan a year earlier.

Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea are as important to Cuba as they are to the Soviet Union. This does not imply that Castro views the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia as unimportant; rather, it is a recognition of the fact that the Caribbean island considers fewer geostrategic issues than the Soviet Union. Ethiopia and the Cuban involvement there is important to Castro because the Cuban presence lends credibility to Castro's status as an international revolutionary figure. During his September, 1978, trip to Ethiopia, Castro reveled in his role as an active international revolutionary leader.

However, as far as Castro is concerned, Cuba will

gain little international status by defeating Eritrean secessionists, some of whom trained in Cuba. Not surprisingly, Cuban and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa have noted that Castro is not willing to commit sizable numbers of men to the Eritrean conflict. In an April 26 speech in Havana during Mengistu's visit to the Cuban capital, Castro hedged his bets by defending Ethiopia's right to "protect her territorial integrity . . . against Eritrean secessionists" while at the same time declaring that Cuban forces would not "remain with arms folded if there is a new invasion of Ethiopia." More recently, Castro informed another Cuban audience that their country could not be neutral in the struggle between the "Ethiopian revolution and the Somali aggressor."<sup>25</sup> It may be argued that the Cuban leader is seeking to separate the Ogaden and Eritrean conflicts in the minds of his people to build support for a continued Cuban presence in Ethiopia, including large-scale involvement in the Ogaden. Indeed, according to United States intelligence sources, the November, 1978, Ethiopian offensive against the Eritreans was undertaken not with Cuban troops, but rather with Ethiopian troops moved to Eritrea from the Ogaden after Cuban troops expanded their operations in that desert area of Ethiopia.

If, in fact, the drive toward ideological and moral leadership of the emerging world is a leading motive force behind Cuba's presence in Africa, then there are greener pastures than Eritrea, notably in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Cuban forces are also needed by the Agostinho Neto government in Angola. Thus, Cuba's interests in Ethiopia and Eritrea, although considerable, are apparently less strong than those of the Kremlin.

While the Soviet Union failed to maintain its influence in Somalia and gain influence in Ethiopia, that failure has not seriously damaged the Soviet position on the Horn of Africa, in the Red Sea littoral or in Africa as a whole. This, of course, assumes that Ethiopia succeeds in maintaining control of Eritrea, which appears likely. Cuba, meanwhile, has strengthened her revolutionary credentials with her opposition to "Somalia imperialism" in the Ogaden, but must still avoid close identification with the Dergue's anti-Eritrean offensive if she wishes to maintain that credibility. In both the Soviet and Cuban cases, several Arab and African states mistrust the outsiders' objectives in Africa; the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopia has heightened that apprehension.

At the same time, Soviet and Cuban interests in Ethiopia, more particularly in Eritrea, are in all probability dissimilar; thus potential Soviet-Cuban disagreement over policy may in fact occur. Such disagreement may illustrate that Castro's commitment to global activism is Soviet-supported but not

<sup>25</sup>Fidel Castro's address in Santiago de Cuba, July 26, 1978, in *FBIS (Latin America)*, July 28, 1978, p. Q1.

Soviet-inspired. At the most, it may deprive the Kremlin of an exceedingly useful agent for furthering its African policy objectives. ■

## UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 100)

a multiracial society in the one part of Africa where there is the least willingness to make it work, especially in view of the fact that it has not worked anywhere else. As this reporter has argued for 20 years,<sup>5</sup> South Africa's ultimate solution seems likely to be either the "Algerian" solution—a total white evacuation—or, more probably, partition, with whites keeping only a small portion of the country, and with very substantial numbers leaving. In Rhodesia, the bulk of the white population also seems likely to flee, with some of it replaced by short-term expatriates without citizenship, as is true in the rest of black Africa.

Too much political importance has probably been given by the administration to Nigeria, which now has a population of about 100,000,000 (one black African in four is a Nigerian) and which is a major source of sulfur-free oil to the United States market. Nigeria would like to be the continental leader. But just as India has about a fourth of the population of Asia, and plays no special role in that continent, so Nigeria has had little if any influence on her 44 fellow members of the OAU. Her size and ambitions make Nigeria more resented than respected by her neighbors. The fact that her government is an unpopular junta adds to Nigeria's negative image in Africa. Certainly, Nigeria's modest intervention on the American and British side in the Rhodesian negotiations appears to have added nothing, either to their preliminary success or to their current apparent failure. West Africa is as different from eastern and southern Africa as Sweden is from Greece, and the notion that General Plusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria would have anything in common with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia except a common fluency in English was dubious from the start. It is perhaps an understandable American illusion to equate influence with size; but in Africa, the United States itself has always been suspect because of its size, while countries like Canada, Cuba and Israel—before her 1967 invasion of Egypt, Syria and Jordan—have been trusted because of their apparent inability to be "neo-colonial."

It may be that at this stage the United States can do little more than buy African acceptance with increased technical, Peace Corps, and financial aid, wait for the Ethiopian-Soviet honeymoon to run its course, as the Egyptian-Soviet honeymoon did, and allow the southern white regimes to test their military

<sup>5</sup>Most recently in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten, eds., *Race and Politics in South Africa*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

prowess against the nationalist challengers presumably fleshed out by Cubans. In the long run, as Ambassador Young has said several times, Africa needs the United States because only the United States can supply technology on the scale that Africa requires; and, as a valid interlocutor between blacks and whites, the United States could become the honest broker after Soviet, Cuban and perhaps Chinese assistance have made black victories possible in the south. Meanwhile, the willingness of the administration to take well-intentioned initiatives has unquestionably improved the United States image in the continent, has encouraged Africans in southern Africa, and has helped confront the white regimes with the reality of their isolation.

What still appears to be missing in the Africa policy of the United States, like the policy of its predecessors, is long-term planning. No contingency work, for instance, has been undertaken with other nations on how the world will one day absorb millions of emigrating white South Africans. Planning should also, perhaps, take account of the much greater likelihood of secession wars, as the first generation of nation-founders passes from the African scene. It should study the rapid growth of Islam, which seems sure to be the faith of three-fourths of the continent—including over 50 percent of black Africans—by the turn of the century, and how this will affect political institutions and international attitudes. Planners should also consider the upward trend in African population growth, at a time when the population of other continents has stabilized or when their annual percentage increases have declined. In addition to trying to solve the problems of the moment, policymakers should, perhaps, be planning for a largely Islamic Africa with a population of one billion and with perhaps 100 nations, enjoying an absolute majority—for better or worse—at the United Nations. ■

## NORTH AFRICA

*(Continued from page 121)*

insurgent force was formed, trained, armed and dispatched into the desert. Over a period of two years, these Polisario units have managed to interdict all the main Mauritanian lines of communication, disrupt that country's fragile economy and affect the morale of both its military and civilian bureaucratic establishment. Round two had gone to the Polisario.

For King Hassan, a crisis appears unavoidable. The first sign of weakening in the Moroccan position crystallized in late 1977, when the Moroccan Army was dispatched in mounting numbers to buttress Mauritanian troops. In time, an uneasy relationship developed, with some Mauritanian commanders fearful that the Moroccans constituted an advance guard for an Army of Occupation. Finally, in mid-1978, the

regime of Mauritanian President Ould Daddah was overthrown and was succeeded by a Mauritanian military group headed by Lieutenant Colonel Mustapha Ould Mohammed Salek. The new Head of State announced on September 30 that Mauritania would welcome an Organization of African Unity (OAU) effort to settle the conflict.

In recent weeks the new Mauritanian government has virtually opted out of the struggle against the Polisario. This has placed added pressure on King Hassan. He has been compelled to widen the area that Moroccan forces patrol; these same forces now bear the brunt of Polisario attacks; and the King must meet their needs for the acquisition of arms and other counterinsurgency equipment.

Hassan's visit to Washington, D.C., placed the United States in a difficult position. The King pointed repeatedly to the contribution his nation is making to Central Africa, where he currently maintains 1,500 troops in defense of Zaire; he has also volunteered to contribute Moroccan units for a Pan-African emergency force to be used for peacekeeping in Angola, the Horn region or other African flashpoints. President Jimmy Carter's response has been to welcome these initiatives publicly, but to resist requests for arms to be used in the Saharan conflict.

In the administration, an influential group of policymakers views King Hassan with reserve. They are opposed to his generally activist policies in Africa, particularly his cold war perspectives. Hassan's critics would prefer not to bring the cold war to Africa; their general inclination instead is to urge other African leaders to take the initiative in resolving local disputes. They are also guarded in their reaction to King Hassan's problems in the Sahara, contending that he confronts a civil war that can only be resolved through negotiated settlement, one which protects the rights of the displaced Saharan population. On these grounds, they have managed to deflect the urgings of those foreign affairs practitioners in the administration who wish to support the King.

For Hassan the choices are painful, just as the risks are great. He can either make peace on terms that are politically embarrassing or prosecute a war that will probably be protracted and demoralizing. Only a radical change in the government at Algiers is likely to alter the latter prospect. Finally, prolonged strain may well bring Morocco and Algeria into direct conflict. The implications of such a conflict are difficult to assess. However, it could well spell the end of the delicate equilibrium between moderate and revolutionary regimes in North Africa. And, as new generations of leaders come to power, it may well move the power balance in directions unfavorable to United States and Western interests in North Africa, in the Saharan region, and in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. ■

## THE CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES

*(Continued from page 118)*

humiliating but economically prudent step of opening the rail line with Rhodesia for the first time since he had imposed a total blockade in 1973. The move, forced by Zambia's desperate need for fertilizer to help her already ailing agricultural sector, nonetheless could prove perilous. It places the country's economic welfare increasingly in the hands of a government and a system (in Rhodesia) that Zambia is dedicated to eradicating. The move may hand Rhodesia's internal settlement substantial leverage: should the Benguela Railroad not open in the foreseeable future and should the Tazara line atrophy (or even continue to have grave problems), then Rhodesia would hold real economic power (in the form of transportation links) over Kaunda's head. Conceivably, the Salisbury group might try to force Kaunda to hand over Joshua Nkomo to participate in the internal settlement.

But this is speculation. Still, the opening of transport links with Rhodesia set off its own fireworks. Fellow frontline state leaders Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique flew into Lusaka to register vigorous protests. But Kaunda had already made his decision. He did not extend the normal courtesy of greeting these leaders at the airport, but merely saw them for an hour at his office before they departed, dejected and disgruntled. In the airport's departure lounge, Nyerere mumbled something about losing a friend of 20 years' duration.

Kaunda was willing to weather this storm. Substantial opposition to his continued rule had been building, for the first time, spearheaded by the twin complaints of economic decline and the President's alleged preoccupation with southern African affairs. Simon Kapwepwe, political leader of the Bembe tribe and a man Kaunda jailed in 1972 and 1973, announced his candidacy for the presidency in August, 1978, with the blunt remark, "We are really in a mess. The people of Zambia must be fed, must be clothed. Anything else is second." Apparently Kapwepwe and his policies attracted a greater following than Kaunda had anticipated. For the single political party's Mulunguishi Conference over the summer suddenly and secretly amended the constitution to block Kapwepwe and other potential opponents from challenging Kaunda.

With his domestic political problems so expeditiously set aside, Kaunda could turn back to international problems, which could not be so easily resolved. Rhodesia in particular would not cease to inflict her acute pain.

Since independence, Zambia has been closely aligned with the West and has repeatedly urged

stronger Western measures—as Kaunda stated in his provocative but highly publicized April, 1975, White House toast—"to support our efforts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia immediately and the ending of apartheid in South Africa." Correspondingly, he has been fearsome of Communist involvement. It was Kaunda, not Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith or South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster, who called the Soviet Union and Cuba "a plundering tiger and its deadly cubs coming in through the back door" during the Angolan civil war.

Today, Kaunda is discouraged by the lack of an effective Western-led negotiated settlement, particularly on Rhodesia. Zambia now champions Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front—hosting his guerrillas in Zambia and echoing his perspective on political questions—and, in the process, Zambia has become more accommodating to Soviet-Cuban policies. Kaunda welcomed Soviet ex-President Nikolai Podgorny to Lusaka in March, 1977, with a toast drawing a parallel between his ideological beliefs in "humanism" and the principles of Lenin. The two Presidents agreed to broaden economic, technical, and cultural cooperation between Zambia and the Soviet Union. In July, 1978, during one interview, Kaunda called himself an "open admirer of Fidel Castro" because of the "miracle he had done to liberate his people . . . and to build up his country economically." He went on to urge the West to be "patient with this young Soviet Union" which "needs love and assistance. The Cubans need encouragement for the purpose of strengthening the spirit of humanism in themselves."

Despite such movement on the world scene, Kaunda is still almost exclusively focused on regional affairs. Zambia is quickly being drawn in militarily (she was long ago involved economically and politically) in the destructive Rhodesian war. In October, 1978, Rhodesian Army forces attacked bases in Zambia—killing an estimated 230 ZAPU guerrillas and civilian refugees, wounding another 600, and killing at least 30 Zambian police and security soldiers. The Lusaka airport tower was forced to cooperate with the Rhodesian strike force, as publicly released conversations made embarrassingly evident.

After the raid, the British government dispatched some \$15 million worth of mine detectors and anti-aircraft and communications equipment to Lusaka. Kaunda requested the supplies to head off another humiliating Rhodesian incursion; the British responded to head off the possibility that Zambia would turn to the Soviets and Cubans.

Still, these are only stop-gap measures to help hold Zambia above water militarily—while some \$400 million in long-term IMF loans and a three-year \$100-million United States aid effort helps economically—until the Rhodesian tragedy is played out. Un-

fortunately for both Zambia and the other countries in Central Africa—to say nothing of the Rhodesian people themselves—this still appears far away.

### ANGOLAN PROSPECTS

No such dismal outlook faced Angolan President Agostinho Neto at the close of 1978. Indeed, for the first time since he was thrust into power by the massive 1975-1976 Soviet-Cuban military intervention, his prospects are brighter.

First and most important, resistance movements to his regime may be disappearing. As Neto pledged to disarm Mobutu's opponents, so Mobutu pledged to cease all assistance to Neto's opponents, primarily to UNITA, which still claims to control over one-third of Angola and some 2.5 million persons. Zambia can likewise be expected to stop direct or indirect support for UNITA—despite Kaunda's obvious personal affection for UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi—particularly if the Benguela Railroad may be reopened. Rumors indicate that the French will also stop their assistance to UNITA; until now, Paris has been the largest source of outside support except possibly South Africa.

Closing the money spigot to UNITA may indeed dry up its campaign to oust the Marxist Neto regime. But it may not. Savimbi's devoted band began with "12 people with knives," as he once said, and with virtually no outside support. It may continue its assault against the MPLA largely on its own resources, meager as they may be. The test will, of course, be the effective reopening of the railroad: should this take place as promised, then obviously UNITA has faltered; should it not, then UNITA must still be considered a potent force in Central Africa.

Second, Neto can take solace in his continued close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. In many Western circles, this is unexpected. More than three years ago, for example, Senator Dick Clark (D., Iowa), then Chairman of the Senate African Subcommittee said, "If the MPLA wins, the Soviets will be lucky if they can hang on a year or two." But the MPLA won and the Soviets have hung on more than a year or two. In October, 1978, still another Angolan-Soviet cooperation agreement was signed, this one "with a view to further strengthening the ties of friendship between the two countries." The Kremlin has supplied tanks, Mig-21's, air defense equipment and naval vessels to Angola, while more than 1,000 Russians are in Luanda training the secret police and military officers. Still, the Angolan government has not permitted Soviet bases, as many Westerners had feared. In fact, the MPLA constitution explicitly prohibits the "installation of foreign military bases on national territory."

President Neto does not mince words about his dependence on Communist comrades. Last June he

told *Le Monde*, "We are not independent of Havana or Moscow. Cuban military aid has certainly become essential to us." It certainly has, since the Cubans help to maintain whatever stability the government can muster and help operate the police, army, government agencies, ports and factories. Best of all, they have helped to retain Neto in power—as during the May, 1977, coup attempt by the Nito Alves wing of the MPLA—and have provided support for his minority government (which has not branched out sufficiently to win support from any but some one-fifth of the population). Because of continued fighting in Angola, Cuba has boosted her troops' strength, now estimated at only slightly under 20,000, since the civil war. The glamor of a quick victory against feeble opposition (particularly from the FNLA) has vanished because of the tedium of counterinsurgency against spirited resistance (particularly from UNITA). Castro, who himself glorified guerrilla movements with rural support battling an unpopular puppet regime, now faces a strong opponent in the form of Savimbi—who, like himself, is bearded, fatigued-clad and charismatic.

Neto is pleased about his new rapport with the West. A melting of the formerly frigid relations with Portugal is under way; full diplomatic relations finally opened, bringing a host of bilateral discussions over matters ranging from development assistance to repatriation of refugees. Angolan officials, for the first time since independence, are now encouraging the return of white technicians, professionals and skilled workers to help stiffen their limp economy. As yet, only a few thousand—of the estimated 350,000 who fled during the war—are preparing to return. Still, the movement back to Angola lends encouragement to those intent on internal development.

These encouraging signs come none too early; Angola has struggled with an acute economic crisis over the past three years. The few reports leaking out of the country (where Western journalists are barred) paint a rather dismal picture of recurrent food riots, medical epidemics and general hardship in urban areas. Most crops, including the once-lucrative coffee, are no longer being planted in significant quantities. Medical services are scarce and malnutrition is said to be widespread. The school system is crippled, with only one percent of secondary school teachers now teaching.

The one redeeming element has, ironically, been Marxist Angola's continued dependence on the capitalist bulwark, Gulf Oil. By exploiting the Cabindan oilfields, Gulf provides some \$500 million per year for the government's coffers. In recent years, Gulf's payments accounted for a full four-fifths of Angola's export earnings and three-fifths of her total government revenues.

Neto's relations with the United States are also

thawing. Top American diplomats have visited Luanda and found the government helpful on Namibia. Current United States policy dictates no normalizing of relations while the Cuban forces occupy the country; nonetheless cooperation and even assistance may take place.

Relations with the United States could be enhanced by an improvement of human rights conditions in Angola. In early 1977, Neto frankly admitted, "We aren't a bourgeois democracy. From now on, the dictatorship will be a little more strong." He has been true to his word; the regime does not allow a free press, an independent judiciary, free speech or political competition. Angola's new secret police is, ironically, staffed by old professionals: the Africans who worked as informers for the Portuguese are back in service under Neto, with greater powers than ever.

In early 1978, the bishops of Angola issued a statement condemning human rights violations in their country. They told of the "frequent and lamentable violations of religions" and said they "witness with sorrow the systematic propaganda in favor of atheism" in the Marxist press and the educational system. "Freedom of speech has practically disappeared on the public level. Arbitrary arrests and prolonged imprisonment have taken place on unfounded suspicion without proper trial, as guaranteed in the constitution." Other complaints were bluntly registered.

Despite her innumerable problems, Angola seems headed for a more politically stable and economically prosperous period. She faces the future with greater optimism than a year ago. And Angola has contributed to healing some of the deep wounds in the suffering but still important Central African region.

## GHANA AND NIGERIA

*(Continued from page 126)*

high prices. Equally critical factors could be laid at the government's door. The attempt to generate an increase in economic activity in the absence of foreign currency inflows led to increasingly large government budget deficits (i.e., printing money); total budgetary expenditure increases over previous years were 6.1 percent in 1972-1973, 38.8 percent in 1973-1974, 49.3 percent in 1974-1975, at least 32.5 percent in 1975-1976, and large increases since then. A greatly overvalued currency led to the wide-scale smuggling of items abroad, including cocoa; profits were converted back into Ghana cedis at four to eight times the official exchange rate. There was a shortage of essential consumer and producer goods; the attempt to control their prices led to their frequent disappearance from the market and to the black marketing of many items. Government attempts to channel food into the towns and into new popular distribution

channels (trade unions, food cooperatives) led to rural food shortages. The inflation rate increased so rapidly from 1975 on that the government moved desperately from one expedient to another to try to solve distributive and production problems. While many such efforts were populist, they also proved inefficient. Indeed, military economic management proved generally inefficient, non-rigorous and probably corrupt. To maintain support, the government kept pumping money into the economy; it did increase employment, although often in an unproductive and costly fashion.

In 1972, the consumer price index (1963=100) stood at 226.7 and the local food index at 259.4. By August, 1977, almost six years later, the consumer price index had risen to 1,729.2, or by 790 percent; the local food index had risen to 2,677.8, or by 1030 percent. Inflation in 1978 increased at over 100 percent, especially after the new military leadership finally (and necessarily) devalued the cedi in several stages by 140 percent. Ghana's economic crisis has impoverished the great bulk of the population, enriched only the traders, speculators, and the corrupt, and has wholly undermined popular support for military rule.

## THE ROAD BACK TO CIVILIAN RULE

When the Nigerian FMG under General Gowon was failing to take steps in 1973-1974 toward re-establishing institutions for civilian rule, many voices were raised that reminded the government of its pledge to restore civilian rule by 1976. Simultaneously, those critics protested public corruption, government indecisiveness, and the dangers of continued military rule. Among the most active in the discussions and statements were Nigeria's intelligentsia, lawyers and university professors, many of them serving as commissioners in state governments. Some businessmen were also vociferous in denouncing corruption. In addition, although the press is mostly government owned and is periodically constrained and harassed, the daily press played an important role. Popular and elite criticisms of Gowon's power and his decision to postpone civilian rule had not become a protest movement when Gowon was overthrown and Mohammed and, subsequently, Obasanjo set out a new schedule for the transition from a military to a civilian regime.

Despite the assassination of General Mohammed in February, 1976, the FMG has kept to its schedule. A constitutional drafting committee of 50 was appointed in October, 1975. It delivered a draft constitution by September, 1976, which the FMG published and opened for national debate. A fairly vigorous debate in meetings, universities and the press followed during the next year. The FMG also insisted on establishing a new local government system and holding local elections (December, 1976) on a non-party basis. The

exact form of local government system established was left to the states and adapted to local customs and traditional authority arrangements. The local councils then served as electoral bodies for the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly; local councils could elect members or nonmembers.

The Constituent Assembly met during 1978, mounted a sustained debate on highly controversial constitutional questions, and made a number of important changes in the draft. (It declined to provide constitutional protection for freedom of the press; the FMG has ignored the drafting committee's recommendation that neither federal nor state governments should own newspapers.) Its membership was composed of former politicians and included new faces, including many who have served as commissioners (i.e., ministers) in the state and federal governments. Socially, its membership was drawn exclusively from Nigeria's upper middle class of lawyers, professors, businessmen and company directors, former senior civil servants and a few ex-officers. The Supreme Military Council then made further amendments to the constitution, many of which strengthen state power; one change prevents anyone holding executive or legislative office from engaging in a private business or profession. The FMG itself then promulgated the constitution.

The new constitution of Nigeria, with 19 states, at least 80 million citizens, and 47 million currently registered voters, includes the following provisions: an executive President and Vice President are chosen in elections separate from those of the two-house National Assembly and limited to two 4-year terms of office; the Assembly is composed of a Senate of five members from each state and a House of Representatives of 450 members, allocated on the basis of population; federal (and state) ministers are not drawn from the National Assembly. Amendments require passage by two-thirds of both houses and two-thirds of the state (unicameral) assemblies, except for certain fundamental rights and entrenched provisions, which require approval by a three-fourths vote of both federal houses and two-thirds of the state assemblies.

The growth of federal power is reflected in the wide range of problems that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, including regulation of all agencies to fulfill the constitution's fundamental objectives, safeguards for essential supplies and their prices, the control of marketing boards, banking, and the exclusive right to borrow for government purposes (state or federal), regulation of trade between states, and control of income tax rates. The Constituent Assembly transferred from federal to concurrent state-federal jurisdiction the control over electric power, agricultural and commercial development and university education. Relations between the federal government and states on financial matters are largely

automatic; federal disbursements to the states are made from a "distributable pool," controlled by an independent body and based on an agreed formula of 50 percent on the basis of equality and 50 percent on the basis of population. Constitutional provisions make the creation of new states virtually impossible.

The concern for national unity is made clear in several provisions. The election of the President by nationwide universal suffrage requires not only a majority but also at least one-fourth of the vote in two-thirds of the states; state governors must obtain a majority and at least one-fourth of the vote in two-thirds of the local council areas. If no presidential candidate wins on this basis, the members of the state and federal legislatures (1,500 + voters) elect the President, choosing from the two leading candidates. The independent Federal Electoral Commission that runs federal and state elections is also authorized to ensure that all political parties are national in scope, in terms of representation of people from at least two-thirds of the states on its own executive, that they are run properly and do not employ thugs or engage in violence. The commission can enforce the standards and rules it promulgates by withdrawing its recognition from any party that deviates from its rules; a party must be recognized before it can contest an election.

After October 1, 1978, the ban on parties was lifted, and a vast number were recognized. Three major parties, headed by former politicians, appear to have the most support. "Ethnic arithmetic" is clearly involved in emerging coalitions.

## GHANA

Ghana's return to civilian rule has been far more violent and disruptive. The Ghana Bar Association and the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) have been the most articulate and persistent groups that demand a return to civilian rule. They have expressed the sentiments of a far broader segment of the population with regard to the SMC's disastrous economic performance and its growing authoritarianism. In response to public pressures, in the fall of 1976 Acheampong and other military leaders started to talk publicly about a "union government," a form of national rule in which all sectors of the population would participate. "I do not really mean full civilian rule," noted Acheampong. The proposed government would involve an institutional role for military and police participation in government; no political parties would be permitted. Political parties are a recurring subject of debate in Ghana, where many believe that political parties are highly divisive, create (rather than reflect) conflict and arouse ethnic and regional antagonisms.

Throughout the fall of 1976 and in early 1977, there was a widespread, fairly open public discussion of the

notion of union government. In January, 1977, Acheampong appointed an ad hoc committee on union government to consult the public and to make constitutional recommendations. The committee at first declined to hear anyone who opposed union government, although many who appeared before it insisted on discussing "the moral degeneration of Ghanaian society and the scarcity of food." The Bar Association and NUGS, who regarded union government as a means for prolonging military rule, denounced the committee as a "sham." Without political parties, it was argued, elections would lack meaning and an executive would arrogate power to itself.

University student protests, initially over food prices, led the SMC to close the universities for a third time. This action and attempts to dismiss some leading professionals led to a confrontation between students, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professional groups and the military government. This further politicized the professional associations. Led by the Bar Association and grouped in the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, they went on strike in late June, 1977, issuing a statement accusing the government of incompetence and corruption and demanding its resignation and a turnover of power to civilians.

The military government rejected these demands but on July 1 it announced a two-year schedule for a return to civilian rule: the ad hoc committee on union government would report within three months; a referendum on union government would be held in March, 1978; in April, a constitutional drafting committee would be appointed and in November, a Constituent Assembly would be formed, which would complete its work by March, 1979. Elections would be held on June 15, 1979, and the new government would assume office on July 1. The professionals rejected this but finally called off their strike after 19 days, believing that the schedule would be reduced to one year. The SMC was able to stay in power only because the member unions in the Trades Union Congress (TUC) opposed the strike and especially the lawyers who led it. The unions (representing 500,000 workers) had gained significant benefits under Acheampong, who chose July 1 to announce a long-needed 50 percent increase in the minimum wage.

The ad hoc committee's report, which is not binding on any Constituent Assembly, recommended provisions for a "non-party" national government, with an executive President and a single-chamber National Assembly. It also recommended that neither the military nor the police be given institutional representation in government. Throughout the winter and spring of 1978, a vigorous campaign developed for the March 30 referendum, which permitted a choice only between approval or non-approval of the union government idea. However, as opposition mounted, the

referendum focused on the performance of the military government and, given the argument over party politics, on the type of political participation Ghanaians wanted.

There was little pretence of fairness in the campaign. Three groups arose to oppose union government, and among their major leaders were representatives from the CPP, PP, lawyers and academics, and former General A.A. Afrifa, who had participated in the 1966 coup. The SMC refused to permit these groups to hold rallies, and thuggery and violence was employed to break up meetings and harass leaders. The two major religious bodies in the country denounced government "intimidation and molestation," and government repression itself became an issue. Student demonstrations were broken up by police invasions of universities and secondary schools. Government-owned newspapers and radio and television trumpeted their support for union government, while a few small private newspapers, and the heretofore innocuous, *Catholic Standard* weekly, indicated their opposition. On election day, as the military moved to prevent public tabulation of the votes, the Electoral Commissioner felt compelled to flee and hide.

One official set of referendum results gave the SMC and union government 55.6 percent of the votes, the opposition 44.5 percent. There were cries of fraud and a second set of figures. Immediately after the election, the SMC moved to ban those groups which opposed union government. Announcing a plot, the military arrested vast numbers of opposition leaders. Again the lawyers went on strike, and university students and some others stayed out of their schools. Some leaders went into hiding, others into exile. In the aftermath of the election, economic conditions became even more desperate, and for a week there was an almost total shortage of gasoline.

Acknowledging the country's increasing opposition to Acheampong and contempt for the military, on July 5 junior officers, meeting in the Military Advisory Committee, persuaded their senior officers, led by Chief of Defense Staff General F.W.K. Akuffo, to remove Acheampong from power. Over the next few days, Akuffo removed other service leaders. Acheam-

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## SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

*(Continued from page 104)*

tional Court of Justice to ask the Court to rule that the application of apartheid in the territory was contrary to the letter and spirit of the international conventions applicable to this League mandate. The assumption was that once the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the South African government would be induced to dismantle the apartheid machinery lest it be found in contempt of the Court's judgment. If it were in

contempt, then the United Nations Security Council could act forcefully against South Africa for non-compliance. The assumption was not put to the test because the Court declared that the plaintiffs had no standing in law to bring such legal action; thus a technical decision avoided the merits of the case and amounted to a default in South Africa's favor.

With the termination of the contentious proceedings in 1966, the International Court was consulted in 1971 for an advisory opinion with regard to the legality of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia.<sup>20</sup> The African states and states whose delegations supported the Africans were able to bend the United Nations General Assembly to their will because of their voting strength, but they lacked the military and economic clout to force South Africa out of Namibia. African nationalists from Namibia consequently developed an exile organization that enjoyed the patronage of the OAU and acted as the diplomatic corps of the domestic cadre of SWAPO (the South-West Africa People's Organization). Shortly after the 1966 judgment of the International Court, which was a grievous blow to SWAPO, the African nationalists of SWAPO began their guerrilla war in the northern portion of the territory.

The regime in Pretoria has found SWAPO anathema, but has not yet banned that organization, perhaps because Namibia has increasingly become identified as international territory even by states cordial to South Africa. South Africa has been negotiating with representatives of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Canada to devise a strategy of South African withdrawal that, although it concedes independence to Namibia, presumably does not endanger South African and Western interests in the territory and that may enable SWAPO's domestic opponents to defeat SWAPO in an open and internationally supervised election.

The authorities in Pretoria do not concede SWAPO's right to primacy in the politics of Namibia, doubtless because of its alleged sympathy with the Soviet bloc and its willingness to sustain a guerrilla war in rural areas adjacent to safe havens in Angola and Zambia. As part of their counterinsurgency program, the South Africans have deployed troops on their northern perimeter, engaged in hot pursuit over the border, recruited Africans and Coloreds into their Defense Force to serve on the border, encouraged the growth of moderate African (especially ethnic) political groupings, backed traditional leaders in the northern area (called Ovamboland or Owambo), and

utilized Walvis Bay (Namibia's only functional access to the sea) as a diplomatic choke point. In December, 1978, South Africa arranged local elections presumably as a prelude to United Nations supervised elections that will be an integral part of the protracted withdrawal from South Africa's burden of empire north of the Orange River. ■

## RHODESIA IN CRISIS

(Continued from page 109)

called for the creation of a Senate, allowing whites one-third of the 30 seats, with another third going to the tribal chiefs, longtime allies of the white power structure. The arrangement would enable whites to hold 48 of the 130 parliamentary seats.

The guerrilla response was a mid-December attack on Rhodesia's main fuel depot in Salisbury, causing the beleaguered regime to lose more than a month's supply of desperately needed petroleum. This came in a year of revelations that some Western oil companies had secretly and indirectly supplied Rhodesia with fuel since UDI, in violation of a United Nations trade embargo. On January 2, 1979, a draft constitution was published, proposing "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" as the name of the new state. The fact that black nationalists in the biracial transitional government agreed to the retention of "Rhodesia" was a further indication of their dependency on white power for their own political survival.

The Rhodesian-Zimbabwean crisis will not be resolved by the civilian Rhodesian government, South Africa, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Cuba, or the front line states, acting in concert or unilaterally. The country's future is now in the hands of the military/civilian leadership of ZANU and ZAPU. The power struggle is no longer simply black versus white. Differences of ideology, ethnicity (Ndebele versus Shona), personalities, and strategy among blacks have come to the forefront. A peaceful transition to majority rule and a unified democratic and independent Zimbabwe will prevail only if and when the various black nationalist factions agree to submerge these differences for the cause of national unity.

Rhodesia has enormous potential for dynamic economic growth. She has vast mineral and agricultural resources, and she boasts a modern industrial sector second on the continent only to South Africa. The British, Shona and Ndebele populations are well educated and enjoy one of the finest infrastructures in Africa. But today, the country is sliding into anarchy and a hideous civil war. Three interneccine struggles are tearing the land apart: one within the leadership of the military wings of each guerrilla movement, another between the two factions of the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU) and still another between

<sup>20</sup>Those interested in the international law aspects of the various South West Africa/Namibia cases should consult Solomon Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

the Rhodesian armed forces and the guerrilla armies.

Rhodesia would probably have become an independent black-ruled Zimbabwe at least six years ago were it not for the bitter rivalries in the top echelons of the black nationalist leadership. If the civilian rank and file in these movements cannot soon exert stronger influence over the direction of policy, leadership in the Patriotic Front may pass to the military commanders, most likely to the tough Josiah Tongogara of ZANU. A surprising amount of goodwill and informal dialogue still exists among the Shona-speaking middle-level officials of the rival groups, many of whom are related to each other by family, clan or school background. Thus the foundation for unity is there. Moreover, ZAPU's membership consists of both Ndebele and Shona speakers.

There is also the possibility that Robert Mugabe, who is trying to mold ZANU into a revolutionary socialist movement along the lines of FRELIMO, Mozambique's ruling party, will win broad support from the socialist African nations as well as from the Communist bloc countries. Mugabe's ZANU may also be able to transcend tribalism, through Marxist ideology. Mugabe is ethnically related to the Shona, the indigenous people, who constitute 85 percent of the country's population. The Ndebele, to whom Nkomo is related, came into Mashonaland as conquering imperialists in the 1840's, followed by the British, under Cecil Rhodes, in the 1890's. Mugabe, in alliance with fellow Shona, may rob Nkomo of his Shona supporters, leaving ZAPU with a narrow ethnic base. Such a development could lead to a civil war, with bitter tribal overtones. There is a real possibility that, for the first time since the 1840's, the Shona will rule in the lands of their ancestors. ■

## GHANA AND NIGERIA

(Continued from page 136)

pong was accused of having taken decisions by himself; the collective responsibility of the military was reaffirmed. Akuffo immediately released all those who had been detained by the government after the March 30 referendum and appealed to Ghanaians to return from abroad. He established a "think tank" of leading economists and followed advice to devalue the cedi and to cut government spending sharply to reduce inflation.

While Akuffo pledged the SMC to turn over power to a popularly elected government in July, 1979, he and the SMC did not repudiate union government or the referendum. "They have changed the number plates, but it is the same car," observed one Ghanaian. After a three-and-a-half-month strike, lawyers returned to work on July 23, having held out an extra two weeks after the coup to maintain their pressure. On July 31, after extensive consultations, Akuffo

announced that Ghana needed a quiet period of transition. A transitional national government would be established in July, 1979, with political parties prohibited; after at least four years, Ghanaians could adopt a new constitution. This proposal was unacceptable to those who had opposed union government. And as the new SMC moved to clear the Acheampong government debris, minor changes and reforms initiated new public demands and pressures. More government officials were removed. The SMC responded to demands for freezing and investigating the assets of Acheampong and his family and others allegedly engaged in corrupt activities. The government responded to public demands for the release of commission of enquiry reports previously withheld; and it established new commissions of enquiry. The dam broke on workers' restraint, and many strikes followed, at least 80 in a four-month period, including one by civil servants. Civilian demands became more aggressive; the military more defensive.

Finally, on November 30, 1978, Akuffo announced that the ban on political parties would be lifted on January 1, 1979, and that elections could be contested and the new government formed on the basis of parties.

There is no doubt that without the prolonged resistance of important sectors of the Ghana public, including the most organized and educated groups, the military would have persisted in power in Ghana. The resistance finally caused cleavages in a military that is reluctant to see itself regarded as brutal and oppressive. The collapse of military rule would have come earlier if the TUC had joined the protest. Few African countries, however, have either the educated and organized middle and professional class or the trade union organization that Ghana and (to a lesser degree) Nigeria possess. If Gowon had not been overthrown in Nigeria when he was, the level of civilian protest against military rule would probably have increased there as well. ■

## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 128)

AFRO-ARAB RELATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER. By E.C. Chibwe. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 150 pages, appendix and index, \$17.95.)

The large increases in oil prices since 1973 have caused great economic distress in many African states while the OPEC nations have collected massive amounts of money for investment at home and abroad. E.C. Chibwe examines the increasing cooperation between the Arab and African states and concludes that the latter need investment and trade rather than aid from OPEC. O.E.S.

(Continued on page 144)

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1979, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arms Control

Jan. 23—In Geneva, the U.S. and the Soviet Union begin a new series of talks on limiting anti-satellite weapons.

### Middle East

Jan. 5—Israeli Minister of Energy Yitzhak Modai says that "Israel will not go through with a peace treaty" unless she is assured of access to the oil from the Sinai wells that she developed during her military occupation.

Jan. 11—Speaking at a Washington, D.C., press conference, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says that Egypt and Israel have agreed to resume talks on a peace treaty; the procedure has not yet been arranged.

Jan. 16—U.S. State Department special negotiator for the Middle East Alfred Atherton, Jr., arrives in Jerusalem.

Jan. 28—Atherton returns to Washington, D.C., after 12 days of unsuccessful negotiations with Israeli and Egyptian leaders in Jerusalem and Cairo.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Jan. 3—NATO Commander U.S. General Alexander Haig announces that he will retire from his command and from the U.S. Army on June 30.

### United Nations

(See also *Lebanon*)

Jan. 11—Despite the opposition of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the Security Council listens to Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk's official appeal for help against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

Jan. 15—Using its 111th veto, the Soviet Union blocks a Security Council resolution that sought the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Jan. 27—The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the General Assembly begins meetings in Geneva. France is present for the first time in 17 years; China is absent.

### World Council of Churches

Jan. 11—The central committee of the World Council of Churches concludes 10 days of meetings in Kingston, Jamaica, and votes to continue to make financial grants to militant political groups through its Program to Combat Racism; one of the beneficiaries of such a grant is the guerrilla Rhodesian Patriotic Front.

## AFGHANISTAN

Jan. 7—It is reported that thousands of guerrillas are fighting government troops in Kunar province in the eastern part of the country. The guerrillas, who are Muslims, are attempting to oust the pro-Communist government of President Noor Mohammad Taraki, who took power in a coup d'état last April.

## ALGERIA

Jan. 31—Acting Defense Minister Colonel Benjedid Chadli is named President; he succeeds the late President, Houari Boumediene.

## ARGENTINA

Jan. 8—in Montevideo, Uruguay, the foreign ministers of Chile and Argentina agree to submit their dispute over the islands in the Beagle Channel to mediation by Pope John Paul II; they also agree to withdraw their troops from their mutual border.

## BOLIVIA

Jan. 15—in preparation for the July 1 elections, 15 Cabinet members submit their resignations to President David Padilla Arancibia.

## BRAZIL

Jan. 1—After Institutional Act No. 5 expires at midnight, political and civil guarantees are restored.

## CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; China*)

Jan. 2—in an address on Phnom Penh radio, President Khieu Samphan appeals to the U.N. for help; he says Vietnamese troops have attacked Ratanakiri and Kratie provinces.

At the U.N., Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary asks the Security Council to condemn Vietnamese and Soviet aggression in Cambodia.

Jan. 6—Former ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk leaves Phnom Penh and arrives in Peking on his way to the U.N. to address the Security Council. This is his first trip outside the country since the 1975 Communist take-over.

Jan. 7—Hanoi radio reports that Vietnamese troops have captured Phnom Penh and Kompong Som, the country's major seaport.

Jan. 8—in Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese-sponsored National United Front for National Salvation announces the formation of a People's Revolutionary government, with Heng Samrin serving as President of the Revolutionary Council.

Jan. 9—in Moscow, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev says that Cambodian rebels have overthrown a "political system of the Chinese model." He calls Pol Pot's deposed government "a hateful regime and a tyranny imposed from the outside."

Prince Sihanouk arrives in New York to address the U.N. Security Council.

Jan. 11—Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary arrives in Peking; he says Cambodian forces will continue their fight against Vietnam.

Jan. 15—Vietnamese forces reportedly capture the Cambodian town of Nimit, 9 miles from the Cambodian-Thai border.

Jan. 25—Rebel leaders celebrate their victory in Phnom Penh. President Heng Samrin expresses "unlimited gratitude" to the Vietnamese. Fighting continues.

Jan. 30—it is reported that, in a speech last week, newly installed President Heng Samrin accused the government of former Prime Minister Pol Pot of murdering millions of Cambodians after his government took power in 1973.

## CANADA

Jan. 25—in Ottawa, a report issued by the government-

appointed 9-member Task Force on Canadian Unity says the country faces "a crisis of existence" over the issue of French-speaking Quebec. The report urges the federal government to accommodate Quebec and other dissatisfied regions by restructuring its political institutions. The report also says the federal government should not attempt to prevent Quebec from seceding.

### CHILE

(See also *Argentina*)

Jan. 3—In an attempt to prevent an economic boycott by the AFL-CIO and other Western hemisphere unions against Chilean businesses, Labor Minister José Piñeira submits a plan to restore normal labor union activities in Chile.

### CHINA

(See also *United Kingdom; U.S., Foreign Policy; Vietnam*)

Jan. 1—In Peking, Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping and U.S. liaison officer Leonard Woodcock celebrate the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Jan. 4—Hu Yao-pang is appointed to the recently recreated post of secretary general of the Chinese Communist party.

Jan. 5—In a meeting with U.S. reporters, Teng says that China will not send troops to Cambodia.

Jan. 9—Teng tells a group of visiting U.S. Senators that Taiwan may keep both her government and her armed forces and remain autonomous after reunification with mainland China.

Jan. 25—Hsinhua, the government press agency, reports that property expropriated from "capitalists" during the Cultural Revolution will be returned to them.

Jan. 28—Deputy Prime Minister Teng arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Hsinhua officially confirms the death of former Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, who disappeared 13 years ago.

Jan. 29—Hsinhua reports that "citizen's rights" will be restored to former landlords, wealthy villagers and counterrevolutionaries.

### DENMARK

Jan. 17—In Greenland, citizens vote in a referendum on a home rule charter that would remove Danish control from most of Greenland's domestic affairs.

Jan. 24—Official election returns overwhelmingly favor the home rule charter.

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(See *Vatican*)

### EGYPT

(See *Intl. Middle East*)

### EL SALVADOR

Jan. 21—A report issued by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission accuses the government of torturing and murdering political opponents.

### FRANCE

(See *Intl. U.N.; Iran; Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### GERMANY, WEST

(See *Turkey; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### INDIA

Jan. 24—Former Home Minister Charan Singh is sworn in as Deputy Prime Minister for Finance by President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy. Singh was dismissed as Home Minister 7 months ago, in a dispute with the governing Janata party.

### IRAN

Jan. 1—At a news conference in Teheran, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi makes his first public appearance in 2 months; he says he will take a "vacation" once a new civilian government is firmly in power.

Jan. 2—Air Force air controllers replace striking civilian controllers at the airport; 2,000 foreigners leave Teheran by plane.

Oil production reportedly remains 500,000 barrels a day below domestic requirements.

Jan. 6—A new civilian government headed by Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar is sworn in.

In France, opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appeals to government employees to refuse to obey the new government.

Jan. 13—From Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini announces that he has established a shadow Cabinet, the Council of the Islamic Revolution, and that cooperation with the Bakhtiar government will be considered illegal.

The government announces the formation of a Regency Council headed by Sayed Jalaleddin Tehrani to assume the responsibilities of the Shah when he leaves the country.

Jan. 16—The Shah leaves Iran for Egypt after ruling for 37 years.

Jan. 17—In Ahwaz, renegade government troops open fire on anti-government demonstrators; 20 people are reported killed and 200 are wounded.

Jan. 18—Ayatollah Shareatmadary, the most powerful Muslim leader in Iran, asks the people to support the Bakhtiar government for the time being.

In Neauphle-le-Chateau, a spokesman for Ayatollah Khomeini rejects U.S. President Jimmy Carter's request for cooperation with the Bakhtiar government.

Jan. 19—In Teheran, one million marchers peacefully demonstrate their support for Ayatollah Khomeini and his attempt to replace the present government with an Islamic government.

Jan. 22—In Neauphle-le-Chateau, head of the Regency Council Sayed Jalaleddin Tehrani submits his resignation as head of the Council to Ayatollah Khomeini.

Jan. 24—On the 2d day of their visit in Marrakesh, the Shah and his wife hold a press conference; the Shah says he plans to remain in Morocco indefinitely.

In Neauphle-le-Chateau, Khomeini announces that he will return to Iran on January 26 to establish a new government.

Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar promises to resign and let the people decide which type of government they prefer if Khomeini will delay his return.

The National Security Council closes Teheran's International Airport until January 28.

Jan. 26—Despite the government ban on demonstrations, 100,000 anti-government protestors hold their planned procession to mark the anniversary of the death of Mohammed; 15 civilians are reported killed by government troops.

Jan. 27—The government extends the closing of Teheran airport.

Prime Minister Bakhtiar says he will go to France

within 48 hours to meet Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Shah's 4 children and mother-in-law fly from Lubbock, Texas, to Morocco, to join the Shah and his wife.

Jan. 28—Khomeini refuses to meet with Prime Minister Bakhtiar until Bakhtiar resigns from office.

Fighting continues in Teheran.

Jan. 29—Unofficial talks begin between senior army officers and associates of Ayatollah Khomeini.

The government reopens Teheran's airport.

Prime Minister Bakhtiar cancels a \$6.2-billion contract for the construction of 2 nuclear power plants by a French company.

Jan. 30—The Cabinet approves the return of Ayatollah Khomeini. He is scheduled to return to Iran on February 1.

In Washington, D.C., the U.S. State Department orders all its non-essential personnel to leave Iran immediately.

### ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Lebanon*)

Jan. 1—Israeli troops prevent militants of Gush Emunim from establishing a civilian settlement in the West Bank area.

Jan. 15—The government allows the establishment of 3 new military outposts on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip.

Jan. 18—In Jerusalem, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists explode a bomb in a market; 21 people are injured.

Jan. 30—In retaliation for recent PLO bombings in Israel, government troops blow up the West Bank homes of 4 imprisoned PLO guerrillas.

### ITALY

Jan. 26—In Rome, Communist party leader Enrico Berlinguer announces his party's decision to withdraw parliamentary support from the Christian Democratic party of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti.

Jan. 29—In Milan, Emilio Alessandrini, a magistrate in the prosecutor's office, is shot to death in his car by members of the Red Brigade. He is the 3d government official killed by terrorists this month.

Jan. 31—Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti resigns.

### JAPAN

Jan. 30—The Japanese Defense Department reports that the Soviet Union is increasing its troop strength and building bases on the southernmost Kurile Islands, which are adjacent to Hokkaido, Japan.

### KOREA, NORTH

(See *Korea, South*)

### KOREA, SOUTH

Jan. 19—President Park Chung Hee proposes that North and South Korea resume peace talks on easing tension in the Korean Peninsula. The talks broke off in 1973.

Jan. 25—The North Korean government newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* says that North Korea welcomes the opportunity to resume peace negotiations.

### LEBANON

Jan. 19—In the U.N., the Security Council approves a 5-month extension of its peacekeeping operation in southern Lebanon.

Jan. 22—In Beirut, Ali Hassan Salameh, security chief of

the Al Fatah guerrilla group (a branch of the PLO), is killed when a bomb explodes in his car. As head of the Black September group, he is believed to have been responsible for the 1972 Munich attack on the Israeli Olympic team.

Jan. 24—U.N. officials arrange a cease-fire between Palestinian guerrillas and Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Artillery and rocket attacks between the two forces began January 19.

### MEXICO

(See *Vatican*)

### MOROCCO

(See *Iran; Western Sahara*)

### NICARAGUA

Jan. 1—Fighting between Sandinist guerrillas and government forces is reported along the southern border with Costa Rica and in Esteli province.

### PERU

Jan. 5—In an attempt to ward off a general strike called for January 9, the government declares a state of emergency and suspends constitutional rights.

Jan. 10—On the second day of the general strike, most workers ignore the union call and report to work.

### PHILIPPINES

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

### POLAND

Jan. 4—It is reported that the government's 1979 budget appropriations do not include an increase in defense spending; the Soviet Union has asked its Warsaw Pact allies to increase their defense budgets.

Jan. 26—In order to obtain a loan from Western banks, the government agrees to permit private creditors to monitor its economic policies.

### RHODESIA

Jan. 2—The biracial government of Prime Minister Ian Smith publishes a draft constitution for majority rule; under the new constitution, the name of the country will be Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Jan. 8—The Zambia-based Zimbabwe African People's Union reports that it has destroyed an ammunition dump in northern Rhodesia; 19 Rhodesian soldiers are reported killed and 13 wounded.

Jan. 12—Military rule is imposed in 15 more districts.

Jan. 30—In a nationwide referendum, white voters overwhelmingly support a new constitution providing for a black-led government with safeguards for whites. In the elections to be held April 20, 2.5 million blacks will be eligible to vote for the first time.

### SPAIN

Jan. 2—Major José María Herrera Hernández, assistant to the military governor of Guipuzcoa in the Basque region, is killed by terrorists who belong to ETA, a Basque separatist group.

Jan. 3—In Madrid, General Constantino Ortín Gil, military governor of Madrid, is killed by members of ETA.

Jan. 9—In Madrid, Miguel Cruz Ceunca, a Supreme Court judge, is assassinated by terrorists.

### SWEDEN

Jan. 21—It is reported that in an interview last week Prime

Minister Ola Ullsten warned Vietnam that, unless she withdraws from Cambodia, about \$200 million in economic aid from the Nordic countries will be terminated.

### SYRIA

Jan. 28—In Damascus, Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad begin discussions on the unification of the two countries.

### TAIWAN

(See also *China*)

Jan. 11—In Taipei, Prime Minister Y.S. Sun rejects Pe-king's recent proposal for reunifying the two countries.

### TANZANIA

(See also *Uganda*)

Jan. 9—In Dar Es Salaam, U.S. and Tanzanian officials sign an agreement permitting U.S. Peace Corps volunteers to return to Tanzania; volunteers have not been permitted to enter for 10 years.

### TUNISIA

Jan. 10—President Habib Bourguiba returns after more than 2 months in a German hospital.

### TURKEY

Jan. 2—Interior Minister Irfan Ozaydinli resigns; he has been criticized for the government's inability to curtail the recent violence.

Jan. 10—In Ankara, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher begins 3 days of talks with Turkish officials on U.S. military and economic assistance, totaling \$300 million.

Jan. 14—Defense Minister Hasan Esat Isik resigns his post; he is replaced by Senator Nesan Akmandour.

Jan. 18—The United States, France, West Germany and Great Britain open discussions in Bonn to establish a procedure to help Turkey overcome "the most intense crisis in the history of the republic."

### UGANDA

Jan. 26—Radio Uganda announces that President Idi Amin has asked the U.N. Security Council to intervene in the continuing border war between Uganda and Tanzania.

### U.S.S.R

(See *Intl. Arms Control, U.N.; Cambodia; Japan; Vatican*)

### UNITED KINGDOM

#### Great Britain

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 5—In Guadeloupe at the 4-power summit conference, Prime Minister James Callaghan says that Britain will sell Harrier fighter planes to China as part of a \$2-billion package.

Jan. 11—The Transport and General Workers Union extends a week-long wildcat strike into a nationwide strike involving 60,000 drivers. The union is demanding a 25 percent pay increase for its drivers.

Jan. 18—In London, 2 fuel depots on the Thames River are blown up; the Irish Republican Army claims responsibility.

Jan. 23—Railroad workers stage their 3rd one-day strike in 8 days.

Jan. 29—Home Secretary Merlyn Rees says that nearly one-fourth of the striking truck drivers have returned to work.

The railroad unions call off their nationwide strikes. Jan. 30—Disregarding the government's attempt to limit wage increases to 5 percent, striking truck drivers win a 20.75 percent pay increase and return to work.

### Northern Ireland

Jan. 19—In Belfast, Irish Republican Army guerrillas destroy 25 buses worth \$2 million.

### UNITED STATES

#### Administration

Jan. 2—According to White House aides, President Jimmy Carter will resubmit a program of "countercycle revenue sharing" to Congress; \$150 million in direct aid would be available to the nation's financially most needy cities in fiscal 1979 and another \$150 million in fiscal 1980.

Jan. 9—The Food and Drug Administration issues a list of 2,400 prescription drugs by their generic names, considered to be medically equivalent to brand-name products.

Jan. 11—Surgeon General of the U.S. Julius Richmond issues a 1,200-page report, summarizing some 30,000 research papers, which offers "overwhelming proof" that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease and other serious ailments.

Jan. 19—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that it "does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's nuclear estimate of the overall risk of a reactor accident."

Jan. 23—President Carter delivers his State of the Union message to Congress; he asks the American people to "build a new and firmer foundation for the future—for a sound economy, for a more effective government, for political trust, and for a stable peace...."

After meeting with President Carter, General Services Administration chief Jay Solomon says he will remain in his job until the investigation into corruption in his agency is on a "firm footing."

Jan. 26—Former Vice President Nelson Rockefeller dies of a heart attack in New York City.

Jan. 29—President Carter commutes Patricia Hearst's prison sentence; she was convicted for taking part in a 1974 bank robbery with members of the so-called Symbionese Liberation Army, who had kidnapped her.

Jan. 31—Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams proposes a 12,000-mile reduction in the Amtrak rail system; this 43 percent cut will go into effect October 1 unless vetoed by either House of Congress.

Energy Secretary James Schlesinger says that the administration must decide by April 1 what mandatory controls on gasoline and oil consumption must be established to deal with the shortfall in supply caused by the political crisis in Iran.

### Civil Rights

Jan. 12—President Carter dismisses former Congresswoman Bella Abzug as cochairman of the National Advisory Committee on Women because of differences of opinion.

Jan. 13—Of the remaining 39 members of the National Advisory Committee on Women, 23 resign to protest Abzug's dismissal, including cochairman Carmen Votaw.

Jan. 16—President Carter appoints American Association of University Women president Marjorie Bell Chambers as chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Women, succeeding Bella Abzug.

Jan. 17—In the league's annual report released today, National Urban League president Vernon Jordan, Jr.,

says that "1979 promises to be a year of crisis for America's black people" whose condition verges "on disaster."

Jan. 24—Charging that it could not follow the confusing laws, regulations, interpretations and policies of 10 government agencies with regard to equal employment opportunities, Sears, Roebuck & Company files suit against the 10 agencies, asking for an "injunction requiring the defendants to coordinate the enforcement of the anti-discrimination statutes and . . . to issue uniform guidelines . . . to resolve existing conflicts. . . ."

### Economy

Jan. 11—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index (formerly called the wholesale price index) rose 0.8 percent in December; there has been a 9.1 percent rise in 1978.

Jan. 12—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate was 5.9 percent in December.

Jan. 18—The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product (GNP) grew at a 6.1 percent rate in the last quarter of 1978; the GNP grew at an annual rate of 3.9 percent in 1978.

Jan. 24—The Labor Department reports that the consumer price index rose 0.6 percent in December; the annual inflation rate in 1978 was 9 percent.

Jan. 25—In his annual Economic Report to Congress, President Carter says that "in late 1977 and throughout 1978 the slowdown in productivity growth [in the U.S.] reached serious proportions."

Jan. 30—The Commerce Department reports a U.S. trade deficit of \$2.04 billion for December making the 1978 deficit a record \$28.45 billion.

Jan. 31—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.5 percent in December, 1978.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Arms Control; Tanzania; Turkey*)

Jan. 1—In ceremonies at the Chinese liaison office in Washington, D.C., and at the American mission in Peking, full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China are established.

Jan. 6—President Carter and the 3 European leaders of West Germany, France and Britain conclude 2 days of talks in Guadeloupe with assurances that the Western nations remain committed to détente and the conclusion of a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

Jan. 7—After 3 years of discussions, the U.S. and the Philippines reach agreement on treaty amendments that give the U.S. unhindered use of its important air and naval installations in the Philippines.

Jan. 11—Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says that Iranian Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi will soon "leave Iran for a vacation"; he terms this "a sound decision."

Jan. 15—The White House announces that Leonard Woodcock, head of the U.S. liaison office in Peking, will become U.S. Ambassador to China on March 1.

Jan. 17—At a Washington, D.C., news conference, President Carter says, "We are very interested in seeing the integrity of Thailand protected."

Jan. 18—Former President Gerald Ford meets with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Iranian Shah in Aswan, Egypt.

Jan. 26—At a Washington, D.C., news conference, President Carter says that he is committed to a "strong and prosperous and a free people" in Taiwan.

Jan. 29—President Carter and Chinese senior Deputy

Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping confer in Washington, D.C., for 4 hours.

President Carter entertains Teng and Teng's wife Cholin at a formal state dinner at the White House; former President Richard Nixon is also a guest.

The White House announces that President Carter has accepted an invitation to visit China.

Teng accepts an invitation for Chinese Communist party Chairman and Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng to visit the U.S.

Jan. 30—Hodding Carter 3d says the U.S. is ordering the evacuation of all dependents of U.S. government personnel and all nonessential American officials in Iran; other American citizens are also urged to leave because of the "uncertain security situation."

Teng meets again with President Carter at the White House and then meets with members of Congress.

In an interview in *Time* released today, Chinese senior Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping calls the Soviet Union "a hotbed of war" and bids the U.S. to be wary in limiting U.S. arms development.

Jan. 31—At a White House ceremony, President Carter and Teng sign several scientific and cultural exchange agreements.

State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that 1,350 Americans have been evacuated from Iran.

### Labor and Industry

Jan. 5—The Department of Energy sues 9 of the nation's largest oil companies in U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., charging that the companies overcharged customers for "natural gasoline"—butane and propane—which are separated from natural gas after it is removed from the well and are used for home heating. The government alleges that the overcharges amounted to almost \$1 billion.

Jan. 10—U.S. district court Judge Louis Rosenberg rules that the Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers must order its striking members to end their strike within 48 hours; the haulers have been on strike since November 11.

Jan. 11—The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, representing some 60,000 workers, tentatively agrees to a new 2-year contract with the Gulf Oil Corporation. The new contract, approved by the Council on Wage and Price Stability, will give the workers a 13-percent wage rise over the next 2 years; it is expected to set a pattern for the industry.

Jan. 26—The leaders of the Retail Clerks International Union and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen agree to a merger, subject to ratification by members next June, that will make the new United Food and Commercial Workers International Union the largest single union in the AFL-CIO.

### Legislation

(See also *Administration*)

Jan. 15—The 96th Congress convenes.

Jan. 22—President Carter sends Congress a "lean and austere" budget for fiscal 1980, which calls for spending \$531.6 billion, with revenues of \$502.6 billion and a deficit of \$29 billion. The military budget is to be increased 3 percent after inflation, to \$122.7 billion; cutbacks in some social services, aid to cities, health care, energy spending and environmental projects are also proposed; transportation spending is to increase less than the inflation rate.

Jan. 25—The President sends Congress his 23,000-word

State of the Union message, which details his January 23 televised address.

Jan. 26—Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) declares that the President's fiscal 1980 budget "undermines the health care system" of the nation.

### Military

Jan. 11—In an open letter to President Carter, 170 former ranking military officers warn of the "increasing Soviet challenge" to the U.S. and appeal to the President to "restore the global military balance."

Jan. 25—At Senate hearings on the new military budget, Defense Secretary Harold Brown says that "... I must stress that the gap between United States and Soviet defense expenditures cannot continue to expand without a dangerous tilt in the relevant balances of power."

### Politics

Jan. 24—Former Democratic Texas Governor and Richard Nixon's Secretary of the Treasury John Connally announces that he is a candidate for the 1980 Republican presidential nomination.

### Supreme Court

Jan. 8—The Supreme Court refuses to review appeals of a New York City law that provides up to life imprisonment for the sale or possession of small amounts of hard drugs.

Jan. 9—In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law requiring a doctor to perform an abortion by the method most likely to save a fetus old enough to survive outside the womb.

Jan. 16—In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court reverses the ruling of a federal appeals court in Chicago; it rules that workers believing they have been cheated out of their pension rights cannot sue the sponsors of the pension plan under federal securities antifraud laws. Had the Court upheld the lower court, the pensions of 45 million workers would have come under Security and Exchange Commission regulation.

### VATICAN

Jan. 24—In the Vatican, Pope John Paul II meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Jan. 25—Pope John Paul II arrives in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, en route to a conference of Latin American bishops in Mexico.

Jan. 26—In Mexico City, Pope John Paul is greeted by Mexican President José López Portillo.

Jan. 27—Pope John Paul addresses the opening session of a conference of Latin American bishops.

Jan. 29—In Oaxaca, Pope John Paul says that "urgent reforms" must be carried out to aid the poor.

Jan. 31—Pope John Paul ends his 7-day trip and returns home.

### VIETNAM

(See also *Intl.*, *U.N.*; *Cambodia*; *Sweden*)

Jan. 30—In Washington, D.C., U.S. intelligence sources report that Vietnam has significantly built up troop strength along the China-Vietnam border and that China has increased her troop strength along the border to 100,000 troops, several hundred tanks, and about 150 warplanes.

### WESTERN SAHARA

Jan. 20—Polisario guerrillas report they have killed 357 and wounded 191 Moroccan soldiers in a 12-hour battle near Aiun, the capital. ■

### BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 138)

THE WORLD, THE WEST AND PRETORIA. By Alexander Steward. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1977. 308 pages and index, \$14.95.)

AFRICA AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. By Lorraine A. Williams. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1977. 205 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.95.)

AFRICA AND AFRICANS AS SEEN BY CLASSICAL WRITERS, VOL. II. Edited by Joseph E. Harris. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. 162 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.95.)

THE FORGOTTEN FRONTIER: A HISTORY OF THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY IBERO-AFRICAN FRONTIER. By Andrew C. Hess. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978. 278 pages, bibliographical essay and index, \$24.00.)

HOW LONG WILL SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE? By R.W. Johnson. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. 328 pages, \$15.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

A HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC ENDEAVOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by A.C. Brown. (Cape Town, South Africa: Royal Society of South Africa, 1978. 516 pages and index, \$22.50.)


IDI AMIN DADA: HITLER IN AFRICA. By Thomas Melady and Margaret Melady. (Kansas City, Kansas: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1978. 184 pages with photographs, \$7.95.)

AFRICA TODAY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN AFFAIRS. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978. 166 pages, appendix, references and index, \$11.50, cloth; \$6.50, paper.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE WORLD: AUTONOMY OR INTERDEPENDENCE? By Richard E. Bissell. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1978. 67 pages and notes, \$4.00.)

BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: 57 PROFILES OF NATAL'S LEADING BLACKS. By Dee Shirley Deane. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 210 pages with photographs, map and cross index, \$17.50.)

EMERGENT AFRICAN STATES. By S.A. Akintoye. (New York: Longman, Inc., 1977. 250 pages and index, \$4.00, paper.) ■



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